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Many years after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late 1979, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and Robert Gates revealed several formerly classified details regarding the Carter 
Administration’s pre-invasion aid to the Mujahideen resistance fighters. Unwittingly, these 
separate yet interconnected disclosures from Brzezinski and Gates gave the appearance that the 
White House had intentionally lured the USSR into an insurgent-infested trap in Afghanistan 
designed to give Moscow its own Vietnam War. Brzezinski, being in a much higher position 
within the administration than Gates and coming forth with the most provocative revelations, 
was subsequently accused by many of essentially instigating a war all by himself. But although 
Brzezinski had hoped that the Soviets would get bogged down in a “Vietnamese quagmire” in 
Afghanistan if they decided to intervene, he did not attempt to lure the Russians into a trap. The 
covert aid to the Mujahideen was carried out to trap Moscow only if it continued to act 
aggressively in the Third World.  
In addition to Brzezinski’s need to limit the Soviet Union’s capability to project strength 
in the Third World, he admitted to this author that he had other strategic and personal reasons for 
aiding the Mujahideen. Months before President Carter signed the covert aid directive on July 3, 
1979, Brzezinski had begun to receive quite explicit information from CIA assets in his native 
Poland that the situation there was on the verge of an explosion. These developments prompted 
him to turn his thoughts toward both crises simultaneously, with the ultimate goal to develop a 
strategy that would protect his homeland at all costs. In the final analysis, Brzezinski was correct 
in his assessment that aiding the Mujahideen and turning up the heat on the Soviets in 
Afghanistan would later prevent the Kremlin from sending its troops into Poland in order to 




 Almost twenty years after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, a 
series of separate yet interconnected disclosures from Robert Gates and Zbigniew Brzezinski 
created a quiet surge of analyses on the Internet and throughout the academic world. The first 
disclosure by Gates in 1996 revealed to the general public for the first time that President Jimmy 
Carter had actually signed a covert aid “finding” for the Mujahideen resistance fighters on July 3, 
1979—six months prior to the invasion.
1
 Although this piece of formerly classified information 
appeared quite benign when viewed by itself, a second revelation in Gates’ memoirs, From the 
Shadows, gave individuals ample reason to pause. Here, the public was made privy to an odd 
question voiced by Undersecretary of Defense Walt Slocombe in a meeting of the Special 
Coordinating Committee (SCC) on March 30, 1979. During this meeting, led by Deputy National 
Security Adviser David Aaron who was sitting in for NSA Brzezinski, Slocombe asked the other 
high-level participants if it would be advantageous for the administration to keep the Afghan 
insurgency going by “sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire?”
2
 Gates did not elaborate 
on Slocombe’s question, but let it dangle for the reader to draw his or her own conclusions as to 
how the question might have been answered by other members of the SCC.   
 Then Brzezinski entered the equation. In a 1998 interview he is reported to have told the 
French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur that on July 3, 1979—the very day Carter signed the 
covert aid directive—he had written a note to the president giving his opinion that the “aid was 
going to induce a Soviet military intervention.”
3
 After this alleged statement, the reporter asked 
Brzezinski the following question: “Perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into war and 
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looked for a way to provoke it?” He replied: “It wasn’t quite like that. We didn’t push the 
Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.”
4
Later, when 
asked if he regretted any of his actions concerning the covert aid to the Mujahideen, Brzezinski 
appeared annoyed: “Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of 
drawing the Russians into an Afghan trap and you want me to regret it?”
5
 
 As the interview was coming to a close, Brzezinski proceeded to outline the 
“demoralization” that the Soviet Union had suffered due to the extended nature of the war, then 
he turned the tables and rhetorically asked the French journalist a question of his own: “What is 
more important in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some 
agitated Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?”
6
 For the 
record, Brzezinski later denied that he ever claimed that he had sent a note to Carter on July 3, 
1979 stating that the aid would induce an intervention and has vehemently maintained that the 
French reporter did not accurately record that specific statement. Nevertheless, to this day 
Brzezinski has never retracted any of the other statements that were published in the interview.   
Certainly the prospect is intriguing that the administration’s strategy could have possibly 
been to lure the Soviets into an “Afghan trap,” but one might ask, “What did Brzezinski’s policy 
recommendations regarding Afghanistan—covert or otherwise—have to do with protecting his 
Polish homeland?” The answer: Quite a lot, in fact. The parameters of Brzezinski’s geostrategic 
thinking concerning the problems in Afghanistan went far beyond the year 1979, albeit some 
researchers have reduced his objectives to a few short paragraphs—often resulting in abridged 
characterizations. 
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 Warning against this type of indolent strategic analysis, Steven R. Mann of the National 
War College has noted: 
Traditionally, we see strategic thought as the interplay of a limited number of 
factors, principally military, economic, and political. More sophisticated 
discussions expand the set to include factors such as the environment, 
technological development, and social pressures. Yet even this list fails to convey 
the full complexity of international affairs. . . . The closer we come to an honest 
appreciation of the international environment, the more we must confess that it is 
nonlinear and frustratingly interactive. . . . On reflection . .  . it becomes clear that 
“friction” is the rule in life, not the exception. To keep our strategic paradigms 
workable, we have taught ourselves to ignore this. Yet life is too complex to be 




Carl Von Clausewitz once offered a similar critique on this subject by contending that one would 
err in great fashion by limiting strategic thought to “principles, rules, or even systems” for it also 
certainly “involves human passions, values, and beliefs, few of which are quantifiable.”
8
 Thus, 
both Mann and Clausewitz appear to be making the point that many individuals, when assessing 
another’s strategic reasoning, may fail to notice an array of hidden variables due to the 
exceedingly complex nature of the task. 
 Although a vast number of conspiracy theorists have cited Brzezinski’s quotes and Gates’ 
admissions to advance their political agendas via the Internet, very few thoughtful, far-reaching 
academic assessments have explored the problem in detail. On the somewhat rare occasion in 
which credible authors have broached the subject, they have used the information only as 
supplemental material to reinforce broader arguments but have not seriously attempted to gauge 
the journalistic accuracy of the statements attributed to Brzezinski or to provide a comprehensive 
evaluation of his strategic reasoning for aiding the Mujahideen.  
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For example, in Quicksand Geoffrey Wawro uses the Le Nouvel Observateur interview to 
argue that both Carter and Brzezinski “seized upon the deepening problem in Afghanistan” to 
“beat the Soviets at their own game of Third World subversion and insurgency.”
9
 Wawro implies 
that the president and his national security adviser consciously lured the Soviets into their own 
Vietnam, without as much as a trace of additional evidence. Similarly, Phil Gasper’s 
Afghanistan, the CIA, bin Laden, and the Taliban relies on the Brzezinski interview and Gates’ 
book to claim that the “U.S. had in fact been aiding the Mujahideen for at least the previous six 
months, with precisely the hope of provoking a Soviet response.”
10
 Even Chalmers Johnson, a 
former CIA analyst, states in Dismantling the Empire that the “Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 




 Authors with a great deal of notability, too, have been strikingly careless when using the 
Brzezinski quotes. In Haunting Legacy, Marvin Kalb, a presidential fellow at The George 
Washington University and Edward R. Murrow Professor Emeritus at Harvard’s Kennedy 
School of Government, states in dramatic fashion that “Brzezinski . . . saw the invasion as a 
dream come true: a precious opportunity to suck the Soviet Union into its own Vietnam War.”
12
 
 Intermingled with these analyses are more thoughtful research projects that essentially 
end in the same place. At the conclusion of a 2010 interview with Brzezinski, Paul Jay of The 
Real News summarized the content by stating that the “strategy [of inducing a military 
intervention in Afghanistan] achieved its aim, and the Soviets got their Vietnam.” Throughout 
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the discussion Jay pressed Brzezinski, using again the Le Nouvel Observateur quotes and From 
the Shadows.
13
 By and large, the scope of these interpretations is limited to only two sources and 
disregards other information and external influences that occurred before the president’s covert 
finding and any developments which surfaced after the invasion of Afghanistan.  
 Conversely, another group of individuals argue that Brzezinski’s comments to Le Nouvel 
Observateur should warrant deep skepticism. Sir Lawrence Freedman, referring to the 
administration’s intention to “provoke a Soviet invasion,” believes that “some care is needed” 
regarding the interpretation of Brzezinski’s statements. Freedman hypothesizes in A Choice of 
Enemies that Brzezinski’s quotes in 1998 were designed primarily to enable the Carter 
Administration to wrest some of the credit away from President Reagan for bringing down the 
Soviet Union and ending the Cold War. Freedman also believes—quite accurately—that in 1979 
the “U.S. was at most a bit player in a local drama,” noting that the covert aid package of 
$500,000 approved by Carter was marginal at best. Lastly, A Choice of Enemies states that 
Brzezinski was of “two minds about encouraging a Soviet Vietnam” because Moscow’s defeat 
was far from certain, and the administration would have appeared weaker in the domestic 
political calculus if an invasion materialized.
14
  
Steve Coll in Ghost Wars also goes a step further in his analysis of Brzezinski’s 
intentions, yet makes the same critical mistake as Freedman. Coll argues that Brzezinski at the 
time was “very worried that the Soviets would prevail.” Therefore, the president’s national 
security adviser could not possibly have wanted an invasion of Afghanistan to take place. This 
author also claims that the “enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed on 
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the Carter Administration” would have prevented Brzezinski from attempting to lure the Soviets 
into a quagmire.
15
 David Gibbs’ essay Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Retrospect is 
somewhat of a hybrid of the Freedman and Coll analyses, with Gibbs urging individuals to 
approach the Brzezinski interview with a “measure of caution.” The author here does 
acknowledge that “some aspects of the account [Brzezinski’s interview] are confirmed in other 
sources,” but these “other sources” he speaks of is, in fact, only one source—Gates’ memoirs. 
Gibbs’ analysis rests on the “hopes that other persons who were involved in the Carter foreign 
policy, notably President Carter, will offer their views regarding the veracity” of Brzezinski’s 
statements in the French interview.
16
 In various ways, Freedman, Coll, and Gibbs are all correct 
in their assessments of the situation, but each also misses the mark by neglecting to factor other 
variables into the equation. 
In sum, the literature mentioned above and other works which are not listed in the review 
either claim that Brzezinski devised a strategy to lure the Soviets into Afghanistan or that it is 
doubtful he would have attempted such a plan. It appears that the vast majority of these 
conclusions are geared to fit each author’s own preconceived notions of what actually occurred, 
all of which without any further exploration of the subject.    
It would be simple to dismiss the possibility of luring the Soviets into an “Afghan trap” 
as counterproductive and politically foolish, but one must take into account that two major crises 
which helped fuel the narrative that Carter was “weak” had not yet occurred by July 1979.
17
 Both 
the Iran hostage crisis and the flap over a Soviet brigade in Cuba did not materialize until the 
latter part of that same year and both were situations that could not have been foretold. Thus, in a 
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political and national security context, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan only appears as it does 
today when juxtaposed with other problematic events. As administration officials were 
formulating the policies which culminated with the July 3, 1979 covert aid package to the 
Mujahideen, they did so without the added burden of these additional crises entering into the 
calculus.  
  But did the Carter Administration as a matter of policy attempt to “suck” the Soviets 
into Afghanistan, or was the covert aid package only devised to keep them there if they later 
intervened? And what did Brzezinski, Carter’s closest foreign policy adviser, seek to accomplish 
with the covert aid? As the research on this topic progressed, it became abundantly clear that an 
answer to the first question could be rendered quite confidently, yet the reasons behind that 
answer are labyrinthine. In essence, assigning a linear progression—confined to one calendar 
year—to Brzezinski’s strategy would be to commit academic malpractice. Certainly, any 
strategist must evaluate past events and include future considerations when seeking the correct 
policies for the present day, but, in addition to this, Brzezinski’s special brand of forecasting vis -
à-vis Afghanistan incorporated built-in contingency options which allowed for greater flexibility. 
Like other strategists, he was influenced by past events and future possibilities in the global 
context, yet his design was not limited to one scenario that would have achieved the best 
outcome. During 1979 there were numerous equations that would have perhaps been acceptable 
to Brzezinski, with the variables in constant flux. He adapted quite adroitly.  
Couched in the psychologically complex nature of the material is the fact that Brzezinski 
felt fairly sure from the outset of 1979 that the Soviets were going to invade Afghanistan anyway 
due to the Kremlin’s aggressiveness in the Horn of Africa in 1978 and to a lesser degree by the 
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Shah of Iran’s fall in early 1979.
18
 Indeed, the influence of the events in Africa’s Ogaden Desert 
on Brzezinski can not be overstated. Almost everything he conceptualized vis-à-vis Afghanistan 
was in context of the fact that Moscow appeared to be pushing and probing at will around the 
globe while Carter was reluctant to respond due to his fear of upsetting the delicate negotiations 
surrounding the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) treaty. For this reason, Brzezinski 
based certain aspects of the strategic design for Afghanistan on the belief that it would benefit 
the U.S. and others if the Soviet Army were tied down in a “Vietnamese quagmire” if—and only 
if—Moscow decided to intervene. However, his motive was not to lure a reluctant foe into an 
Afghan trap; his actions were geared to trap an aggressive foe if they embarked on the course of 
action he was already fairly certain was going to occur and to stir nationalistic fervor among the 
Mujahideen toward the Soviet Union. But it was also personally important for Brzezinski to keep 
the Soviets bogged down in Afghanistan in the event that they intervened and continued their 
aggressive behavior. Why?  
 Unknown—or overlooked—by many, while the precarious situation was unfolding in 
Afghanistan, Brzezinski was receiving reports from the highest level sources in Warsaw that the 
situation in his native Poland was reaching a “critical stage.”
19
 This prompted him to turn his 
thoughts toward both predicaments simultaneously, with the ultimate aim to develop a strategy 
that would in the end protect Poland at all costs. How this aim would be achieved was the 
million dollar question for Brzezinski. With very few options on the table, he came to believe 
that the USSR would be much less likely to invade Poland if the Soviet Army were tied down in 
a “Vietnamese quagmire” in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, almost all of the intelligence 
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information Brzezinski received from high-level sources in Warsaw throughout the latter part of 
1979 is still classified by CIA; therefore, it was necessary for the purpose of this project to 
analyze information from Poland that other authors have compiled over the last thirty years. 
 While most individuals in the Carter Administration were almost certainly viewing the 
aid to the Mujahideen in a limited capacity, Brzezinski hoped that it might accommodate a 
number of strategic objectives. By analyzing what has been dubbed the “Soviet non-invasion of 
Poland” in late 1980,
20
 it should become quite apparent that his strategic design to keep Moscow 
bogged down in a guerilla war in Afghanistan was, in fact, efficacious, and the Solidarity 
movement most probably benefited from Moscow’s reluctance to intervene in two countries at 
the same time. In addition, Brzezinski’s actions during the “Soviet non-invasion of Poland” in 
late 1980 illustrate beyond a shadow of a doubt that he did not treat both crises equally. Indeed, 
Brzezinski went far above and beyond the call of duty for his homeland in order to prevent the 
Soviets from intervening, while minimizing the adverse ramifications thrust upon the Afghan 
people by the ruthless Soviet machine.  
While reading the material that will follow, it is important to keep at least three factors in 
mind. The first item to take into account is that the human “brain can keep track of two separate 
goals even while it is busy performing a task related to one of the aims.”
21
 Often individuals—
especially strategic thinkers—do not approach foreign policy objectives in a singular fashion, 
although many writers have attempted to reduce strategic thought to a “single aspect.”
22
 The 
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second set of factors to consider is that Brzezinski was born in Warsaw and was not able to 
return after World War II.
23
 Fifteen years after he had left government service, Poland awarded 
him its highest civilian distinction, the Order of the White Eagle, for “supporting his homeland’s 
transformation to democracy.” During the acceptance speech for this honor, Brzezinski stated 
that he had “decided to enter American political life to influence polic y toward his homeland” 
and to “support its efforts to regain independence from Moscow.”
24
 Thirdly, consider that Averill 
Harriman, a trusted aide to President Harry Truman, once revealed to former ambassador to Iran, 
William Sullivan, that Brzezinski was “basically a Pole who had never accepted the American 
ethos” and was “perfectly willing to get the U.S. into a confrontation with Russia for the sake of 
Poland.” Presumably, Harriman’s thoughts were formed over several months when Brzezinski 
was living at the Harriman home in Washington.
25
 As for Harriman’s credibility, Truman, at 
least, was certain: “You could depend on him to tell you the complete truth.  . .”
26
  
In conjunction with the historic strategic importance of Brzezinski’s design, it is also 
imperative from a political and human perspective to know if the Carter Administration 
consciously attempted to “suck the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire” because it has been 
estimated that roughly two million Afghans lost their lives during the war and anywhere from 
500,000 to two million were wounded and maimed.
27
 These numbers speak for themselves and 
indicate that a tragedy of enormous proportions transpired by any estimation. To that end, the 
                                              
23
 Aleksandra Ziolkowska-Boehm, The Roots are Polish (Canadian-Polish Institute, 2000), 4. 
24
 Christopher I. Xenakis, What Happened to the Soviet Union?: How and Why American Sovietologists were 
Caught by Surprise (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 54. See “Zbigniew Brzezinski Gets His Homeland’s Top 
Honor,” The Virginian Pilot, December 20, 1995, A-9.  
25
 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (Simon and Schuster, 
1997), 727-728. The quote is from William Sullivan. 
26
 Dennis Wainstock, Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999), 40. 
27
 Henry S. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention  (Oxford University Press, 1999), 177-178. 
11 
 
presidency of Jimmy Carter would beg for reexamination; after all, the former Georgia governor 
came to office touting the values of human rights and the “search for justice and peace.”
28
  
For this project, interviews were conducted with a number of high-level officials who 
served in the Carter Administration, including Robert Gates, Walt Slocombe, Leslie Gelb, 
Dennis Ross, and David Aaron, but the author’s correspondence with Brzezinski himself was the 
key in shaping the pages that will follow. Being fully aware that he has bristled in the past when 
others have linked his disdain for the Soviet Union with his Polish background, it was certainly 
difficult in our first discussion to probe in certain areas. Yet, as this author learned that even 
Brzezinski’s oldest friends have on occasion intimated to the media that his behavior was heavily 
influenced by his background, it became clear that certain questions must be asked. Quoting one 
of Brzezinski’s close associates, the Washington Post noted: “He is a Polish immigrant, the son 
of a diplomatic family who left when the communists took over Poland. His wife Muska is the 
grandniece of former Czech president Eduard Benes, who was thrown out when the communists 
took over his country. This would explain . . . some of his preoccupation with the Soviets, [and] 
his brusque manner.”
29
 Thus, it became somewhat apparent during the course of the research that 
Brzezinski might bristle, but most likely he would respond to thoughtful assertions with 
thoughtful answers.  
After reading several of Brzezinski’s books and analyzing the numerous statements he 
has made throughout the years, perhaps the most salient aspect germane to his thought process is 
that he is first and foremost a long-term strategic thinker. With this in mind, during a second 
correspondence this author placed the following scenario before him: 
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. . . You thought that the Soviets were going in [to Afghanistan] anyway perhaps 
due to Czechoslovakia in 1968, Angola, and Ethiopia etc., so you and others 
hoped that they would get stuck for a variety of reasons. Among the many reasons 
for you was that the situation in Poland was heating up around the same time (see 
Kuklinski) and if the Soviets were paying a price in Afghanistan, then they would 
think twice before striking at another victim—particularly Poland. 
 
Brzezinski responded, “You read me right on!”
30
 
 Because of the newly acquired evidence noted above and other information gathered for 
this thesis, the first chapter will attempt to give the reader a summary of Brzezinski’s personal 
and academic life. Without this biographical information it would almost be impossible to 
understand the fundamental importance of Poland to him in the overall equation with 
Afghanistan. Similarly, the absence of any knowledge regarding Brzezinski’s academic life 
would totally exclude the foundational aspects of his strategic thoughts which were formed at a 
relatively early age and remained intact throughout Carter’s term in the White House. Chapter 
one also introduces the reader to the close relationship between Brzezinski and Pope John Paul 
II—the first Polish Pontiff in history. It will be shown that both men held an unquenchable desire 
to free their homeland from the Soviet Union, and the timing of the Pope’s election played an 
integral part in the reasons why a nationalistic and religious awakening erupted in Poland at the 
same time Brzezinski was formulating his strategy for Afghanistan. 
 The purpose of the second chapter is to tell the story of how the covert aid package for 
the Mujahideen was conceived, what it entailed, and to convey the known thoughts of the major 
players within the administration. In order to sharpen the narrative, it was necessary to bridge the 
historic gap via interviews conducted in the latter part of 2011. Most of these interviews, 
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however, only confirmed what any serious look into the historical information would have 
provided: Brzezinski was a staunch supporter of the covert aid directive, yet exerted a significant 
personal effort to prevent the Soviets from invading Afghanistan. Wedged into this chapter’s 
content is the limited but vitally important information which shows that Brzezinski, mainly 
through the courageous efforts of Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, was well-informed that Poland 
was on the possible verge of an explosion before the presidential finding was signed. In 
Brzezinski’s mind, this information undoubtedly enhanced the importance of ensuring that the 
Soviets would have a difficult time in Afghanistan if Moscow decided to intervene. 
 In an indirect fashion, chapter three illustrates that, on occasion, extremely important 
historical developments are sometimes neglected if relatively more important events regarding 
that situation occur at a later date. In this part icular case, researchers have all but forgotten that 
many individuals in Poland were fearful of a Soviet military intervention more than a year before 
the actual Solidarity movement took shape. Chapter three also attempts to explain the 
paradoxical scenario in which Brzezinski did not want the Soviet Union to invade Afghanistan, 
but would ultimately use the aid to the Mujahideen and Soviet problems there as a contingency 
measure to prevent a future invasion of Poland.  
 The final chapter of this thesis will attempt to show that Brzezinski did not look upon a 
possible Soviet invasion of Poland in late 1980 in the same manner as others in the Carter 
Administration. In fact, his intimate connection to Poland pushed him to acts which could be 
construed as putting the national interests of his homeland over those of America. Another 
critical aim of chapter four is to show that Moscow’s predicament in Afghanistan was perhaps 
the preeminent reason why the Kremlin decided against a military intervention to quell the forces 
of Solidarity. Prior to this specific project, Brzezinski had never publicly admitted that protecting 
14 
 
Poland was one of his primary motivations for keeping the Soviets bogged down in a quagmire 
in Afghanistan,
31
 and it will hopefully become clear to the reader that he was correct in his 
strategic assessments. 
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Chapter 2—Three Acts of God 
 Among Zbigniew Brzezinski’s contemporary predecessors who also served in the 
position of national security adviser to the president, Henry Kissinger is perhaps the only 
individual with a somewhat similar background as an immigrant. Born in Warsaw in 1928, 
Brzezinski was a member of a generation that witnessed, albeit at a very young age, a Polish 
nation emerging from the partitioning chains of the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian empires.
32
 
His father, Tadeusz, had fought the Soviets in the Polish-Russian War before joining the Foreign 
Service and later accepting a post in the Ukraine in the 1930s.
33
 
 Coinciding with Tadeusz Brzezinski’s arrival in the Ukraine, Joseph Stalin had begun to 
terrorize the peasant population in the Soviet Russia w ith his “forced industrialization” methods 
where any form of dissent from the state’s program was met with swift punishment, including 
execution or deportation to labor camps.
34
 But unlike many of the uneducated masses, the young 
Brzezinski was supremely aware of the atrocities occurring inside of Russia due to his father’s 
position and intricate knowledge of the situation: “My father told me stories,” he remembered. 
“About the mass disappearances, people he would deal with, about how he would have some 
elite in the Ukraine to dinner and he would learn within weeks that they had been arrested and 
then shot. There is no doubt that this had an enormous impression on me at a very young age.”
35
 
During this time even those “Western intellectuals” who were not totally ignorant of Stalin’s 
brutal excesses sometimes chose to ignore them for purely ideological considerations. With 
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capitalism mired in the Great Depression, the Soviet model—whatever its drawbacks—appeared 
to be at least “rational” when compared to the alternative.
36
 
 In October 1938 Brzezinski’s father was reassigned to a diplomatic post in Canada, just 
weeks after Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy signed the much-maligned Munich 
Agreement.
37
 Less than a year later, the German and Soviet armies invaded Poland and 
ostensibly crushed all hopes that Brzezinski and his family would be able to return to their 
homeland anytime in the near future.
38
 This historic event also brought about six grueling years 
of subjugation for the Polish people.
39
 Still only a boy, Brzezinski later recalled his perception of 
the catastrophic events: 
I followed the war with passionate, intense interest. We learned early in the 
morning of September 3
rd
 [1939], and from then on we followed the events of war 
on a daily basis. Then when I was ten years of age I followed the newspapers 
religiously. I would read all the daily dispatches which my father would bring 
home from his office, notably the dispatches from PAT (Polska Agencja 
Telegraficzna). I visited military barracks in Windsor as the guest of General 
Duch who was a Polish commander of the newly formed units in North America, 
and as I looked back at the pages of my diary which I kept as a small kid I’m 
struck by the fact that I recorded in my diary not so much what I or my brothers or 
any parents were doing but what would have happened on that given day or did 
happen on that given day insofar as WW II was concerned. I would simply record 
in my own diary the events of the day and what was happening on the fronts. I 
was especially fascinated by what was happening in Poland and followed with the 





At the beginning of 1945 more bad news was in store for Brzezinski regarding his 
homeland. At Yalta, Roosevelt and Churchill took Stalin at his word that “free and unfettered” 
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elections would take place in Poland at a later date, but Brzezinski and his family, citing the 
Western “charm offensive” with Stalin, believed that the Allies had severely miscalculated the 
mental dimensions of dealing effectively with the Soviets. Brzezinski later wrote, “We do not 
know if the Soviets would have yielded. But we do know that they were not tested. The West 
showed neither foresight nor courage, and this is why Yalta is not only a symbol of the 
subsequent division of Europe but a major historical blot on the record of Anglo-American 
leadership.”
41
   
Even as the war came to a close and Brzezinski’s classmates poured into the streets of 
Montreal to celebrate the Allied victory, he remembers being overwhelmed with sadness: “I did 
not have feelings of joy. . . The war absorbed me so completely that I was emotionally and 
intellectually involved primarily with Poland.”
42
 Unlike millions of others, the end of the Second 
World War was not a joyous occasion for Brzezinski. It was a pyrrhic victory—at best. 
If Brzezinski was disillusioned with the state of affairs vis-à-vis Poland, it would not be 
long before he began to conceptualize a framework which aimed to rot communist Russia from 
its core. In the fall of 1945 Brzezinski entered McGill University in Montreal and excelled 
academically. Five years later he had already finished a master’s thesis titled Russo-Soviet 
Nationalism in which he maintained that the Soviet Union was not a cohes ive bloc as it appeared 
but a “vast expanse of conquered nationalities brutally centralized under a centuries-long process 
of ‘Russification.’” In essence, he believed that the Soviet Union was not invincible, and its 
“Achilles’ heel” and major vulnerabilities could be exposed by antagonizing the various 
nationalities which comprised the larger empire. He later noted, “Once I grasped that in my M.A. 
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thesis at McGill, I began to formulate a strategy to expose the weaknesses of the Soviet system. 
This strategy would move to detach the countries of the Soviet Bloc from the Soviet Union—and 
after detaching them—accomplish the dismantling of the Soviet Union itself.”
43
 
Following his years at McGill, Brzezinski was accepted to Harvard where he began 
doctoral studies in 1950. As a student and political observer, he approved of Truman’s 
unyielding position with regard to the Soviets, yet, at the same time, considered the idea of 
containment to be one which did not go far enough to help Eastern Europe in its struggle against 
Stalinization.
44
 Containment to Brzezinski was tantamount to an unspoken American acceptance 
of Moscow’s strategic supremacy in the region. For different reasons he would also later reject 
the tenets of the Eisenhower Administration’s approach, believing that the policy of “liberation” 
with the objective of “rolling back” Soviet communism was essentially “based on empty 
sloganeering” and void of any long-term strategic viability.
45
 
 Brzezinski’s assessment of the problem proved to be quite perceptive. When the Soviet 
Army invaded Hungary in 1956, the U.S. was hamstrung by the nuclear doctrine of “massive 
retaliation” and declined to provide support to the resistance, both of which afforded Moscow the 
luxury of not having to fight a regional war backed by “limited, yet effective foreign support.”As 
a result, Brzezinski began to advocate an unconventional approach he called “peaceful 
engagement,” an idea designed to utilize American wealth and resources to aid the countries of 
Eastern Europe while simultaneously prying them from the grip of Soviet communism.
46
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At this juncture there was little doubt that Brzezinski was a rising star within the realm of 
academia: “My views gained strategic coherence between 1955 and 1960,” he recalled. “1955 
was the rejection of any illusions about a head-on collision and the pursuit of liberation by 
Eisenhower and Dulles and then through the Hungarian Revolution, through the rise of 
Khrushchev and the appearance of Kennedy, the more systematic formulation of the policy of 
peaceful engagement, as an offensive strategy, and not as a defensive posture, an offensive 
strategy based on historical optimism and not détente, based on Spenglarian pessimism.”
47
 While 
serving as an adviser to the Kennedy campaign in 1960, Harvard released Brzezinski’s work, The 
Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, in which he examined the role of nationalism inside the Soviet 
bloc countries and also within the boundaries of the Soviet Union itself and how it affected the 
Kremlin’s policy objectives. In particular, Brzezinski argued that the Polish October of 1956 had 
illustrated that “ideological and institutional diversity . . . came to characterize the once 
monolithic” nature of the USSR and the “mere similarity of institutions and socioeconomic 
structures was not enough to guarantee unity.”
48
 
In 1961 Brzezinski coauthored a relatively short, yet significant, piece titled Peaceful 
Engagement in Europe. Published by Foreign Affairs, the article was not a comprehensive 
prescription for U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, but it did outline in general terms his belief 
that “gradual change” through economic aid and cultural exchanges was far superior to the past 
policies of containment and liberation.
49
 “I traveled to the region (Eastern Europe) and I talked to 
the people,” Brzezinski later recalled. “And I had a sense of how the mindset of the younger 
generation was being shaped by events—in particular by closer contacts with the West. I was 
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impressed by the vulnerability of the region to the ideas of the West and also by the appeal of the 
Western lifestyle. And therefore I felt that if we just persist and keep on the one hand a strong 
hand on the Soviet Union so it isn’t allowed to expand which would revitalize its ideological 
momentum, but on the other hand kind of foster more and more links—what I called peaceful 
engagement—that the end result would be the dissolution of the system.”
50
 
Although Brzezinski believed wholeheartedly as an academic throughout the 1960s and 
into the 70s that the Soviet system was vulnerable due to its ideological, religious, and 
institutional diversity, there appeared to be no unifying mechanism to marry his theories with 
American policy objectives until three “acts of God” materialized. The first occurred when 
Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyla visited Harvard in 1976. Perhaps due to Brzezinski’s surname and 
because he had been the “subject of frequent attacks in the Polish Communist and Soviet mass 
media,” Wojtyla invited him for “tea and conversation” which resulted in a very close 
connection between the two native Poles from that time forward.
51
 
 The second “act of God” was, of course, Brzezinski’s selection as the incoming national 
security adviser to a sitting U.S. president in 1977. Without access to the American policy-
making apparatus, Brzezinski would most probably have remained a single voice among many 
advocating various positions to weaken the Soviet menace. Just three months after Carter was 
inaugurated, Brzezinski began to push the president to favor those Eastern European states which 
were “somewhat liberal internally or somewhat independent of Moscow,” for this type of 
approach “recognized the American interest in encouraging ‘polycentrism’ and pluralism in the 
                                              
50
 Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski. See Vaughan, “Zbigniew Brzezinski,” 54. 
51
 Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign 
Policy (Cornell University Press, 2009), Note 15, 364. See also Andrea Tornielli, “A Pact Between the Vatican and 
the White House Against the Soviet Empire,” Vatican Insider, June 20, 2011, 





 His recommendations to undermine Soviet rule came on the heels of the Helsinki 
Agreement of 1975, which has been celebrated as a major turning point for the outward 
expression of freedom in communist Eastern Europe. Its provisions required the signatory 
countries, including the USSR, to “practice and foster certain enumerated basic human rights,” 
measures which would later be used by reformers as a basis for their protests and opposition 
toward Moscow.
53
       
 By and large, Eastern Europe and the Soviet homeland had never been the central front 
with regard to American covert activities. In fact, at the beginning of 1977 operations in these 
areas were essentially “nonexistent,” but Brzezinski initiated a number of “covert propaganda 
actions,” resulting in a book publishing program that distributed “Eastern European-oriented 
journals” to the Polish and Czech populations and the purchase of additional transmitters for 
Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. Another Brzezinski brainchild designed to covertly 
whip Soviet Muslims into a religious frenzy ultimately failed; nevertheless, his intentions to stir 
ethnic and religious animosity toward Moscow were sufficiently clear.
54
 Due to these 
unconventional initiatives, the “bureaucracy,” according to Robert Gates, “was gagging on 
Zbig’s effort to turn up the heat on the Soviets internally. This just wasn’t done; it wasn’t within 
the parameters of the rules of the game as it had been played for many years.”
55
 
Brzezinski orchestrated overt moves, as well. Sensing that the forces of liberalization 
were already “gathering momentum” in his homeland, he convinced Carter to travel to Poland 
for his first foreign trip as head of state.
56
 During the president’s visit to Warsaw, Brzezinski 
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made an “on the spot” decision that he and First Lady Rosalynn Carter would pay a visit to 
Cardinal Wyszynski in order to deliver a personal letter from the president. This Cardinal over 
the past decades had become known for his approval of the “spiritual and political traditions of 
the West,” and was revered in Poland due to the courage he had displayed while imprisoned 
during the Stalin era.
57
Although provocative, the visit to Cardinal Wyszynski was only part of 
Brzezinski’s plan to rouse the people of Poland during Carter’s trip. A second gesture was 
intended to strike directly at the heart of Soviet rule, serving to stir the Poles’ continued hope for 
independence. Brzezinski recalled: “The President took another important symbolic step. In 
addition to laying the traditional wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, he paid his 
respects at the monument to the fighters who perished in the Nazi liquidation of the Warsaw 
ghetto in 1943, and then laid a wreath at the foot of the monument to the fighters of the Warsaw 
Uprising of 1944. All Poles understood that this act honored the memory of the Home Army, 




In 1978 the third and last of the aforementioned “acts of God” occurred when 
Brzezinski’s confidant, Cardinal Wojtyla, was elevated to the title of Pope John Paul II, an event 
that brought the Vatican and Eastern Europe a leader who espoused a philosophy of individual 
self-determination where man is free to “challenge the totalitarian state as in Nazism or 
economic determinism as in communism.”
59
 Like Brzezinski, Wojtyla’s views of communism 
were formed not so much on the issue of ideological resistance but through his roots and 
upbringing. Hailing from Krakow, his own personal experiences helped to shape a “unique 
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spiritual, cultural, and geopolitical vision” for his homeland.
60
  Brzezinski, in fact, had been 
accused by “dogmatic blocs” in the Soviet Union and Poland in 1978 for being the main force 
responsible for Karol Wojtyla’s election to the Papacy.
61
 
For John Paul II’s investiture in October 1978, Brzezinski ensured that a number of 
American “heavy-hitters” were in attendance for the ceremony.
62
 Notables with Polish 
backgrounds such as future Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and U.S. Representatives 
Clement Zablocki and Barbara Mikulski made the trip to Rome, while Speaker of the House 
Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, a Roman Catholic, also witnessed the momentous event in St. Peter’s 
Square. On that day Pope John Paul II spoke in unequivocal terms that he was dedicated to 
improving the lives of believers in countries like Poland whose governments had been hostile to 
religion: “Do not be afraid. Open wide the doors for Christ. To his saving power open the 




Pope John Paul II’s investiture was broadcast live to the people in Poland—the only 
Soviet Bloc country which was granted this privilege. Afterward Radio Free Europe and Voice 
of America retransmitted the Pope’s message to other communist states behind the Iron 
Curtain.
64
 No less important to this story, Brzezinski was now in a position to loosen Moscow’s 
grip on his homeland at a much quicker rate that he had ever imagined.      
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 James Rentschler, a former staff member of Carter’s National Security Council, recalled 
that “John Paul II’s heritage was among the . . . Administration’s few lucky breaks. Brzezinski 
skillfully exploited his own Polish birth, his Catholic faith, and a private strategic hunch to open 
a special channel with the Holy See, ensuring direct White House access to the Pope himself. It 
was a link that my NSC buddies and I inevitably dubbed the ‘the Vatican Hotline’—and its 
existence altered the Cold War’s course.”
65
 
 Brzezinski’s connection with the Vatican went far beyond his occasional conversations 
with the Pope, however. Rentschler continued: 
In great secrecy, he [Brzezinski] initiated what historians . . . would see as a major 
Cold War move, working with the man whose power and influence inside the 
Holy See were second only to the Pope’s himself. Meet Agostino Cardinal 
Casaroli, Vatican Secretary of State—a near-septuagenarian whose manner was 
mild, even wispy, but whose subtle negotiating skills, a mixture of toughness and 
tact, had led veteran Curia-watchers to call him “Kissinger in a cassock.” He and 
Zbig were busy hooking up the Vatican Hotline, that Brzezinski brainchild whose 
contributions toward Soviet Cold War defeat would be the luckless Deacon’s 




The correspondence between Brzezinski and John Paul II was conducted through a 
“private channel” and included an “extraordinary spectrum of sensitive issues” such as “arms 
control, human rights, famine relief, popular unrest behind the Iron Curtain, Soviet atrocities in 
Afghanistan, the fate of Catholic missionaries in China, Cuban adventurism in Africa, the Middle 
East peace process, and hostage-taking and terrorism.” Rentschler also quipped, “Should some 
future Cold War Cooperstown ever flourish, Pope John Paul II would be among the free world’s 
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very first inductees—a distinction no doubt partly due to Zbig’s private hunch that sublime late 
October day  in 1978 when a fellow Pole ascended to St. Peter’s Throne.”
67
    
Almost seamlessly melding with Brzezinski’s long-term strategy of “peaceful 
engagement” for Eastern Europe and his effort to rouse Soviet Bloc nationalities was the election 
of a native Pole as Pope, a man who shared an equal commitment to free his people of 
communist rule. This unlikely collaboration afforded Brzezinski the opportunity to use 
Christianity as the workhorse to fast track the ideas he had first formulated years earlier as a 
student at McGill University.  
 Although some have attempted to claim that Brzezinski’s first meeting with then 
Cardinal Karol Wojtyla at Harvard in 1976 specifically laid the foundations to “prime the 
imperfectly-suppressed religious zeal pulsating in the Soviet Bloc,”
68
 there is simply no evidence 
to suggest that this was the case at that early stage. Brzezinski may have held this idea in 1976, 
but to assert that Cardinal Wojtyla was in cahoots from the very beginning is irresponsible, at 
best. Brzezinski had no idea in 1976 that Cardinal Wojtyla would be elected Pope and still 
believed throughout 1978 that the process of de-Russification in Poland would be an extremely 
slow trudge—even with the aid of the Vatican.  
By the outset of 1979, Brzezinski felt that Cardinal Wojtyla’s election as Pope combined 
with Muslim disaffection on the Soviet Union’s southern flank had cleared the way for various 
elements to exact what has been called a “religious pincher movement” on the Kremlin.
69
 
Brzezinski also immediately recognized that the combination of both could play into the long-
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term strategy to free his homeland, but he could not have predicted that the situation in Poland 
would move so swiftly. From that, there is a distinct possibility that the timing of Poland’s march 
toward freedom, aided considerably by John Paul II’s religious message, occurred much too soon 
for Brzezinski. As Henry Kissinger has noted, “Not for nothing is history associated with the 
figure of Nemesis, which defeats man by fulfilling his wishes in a different form or by answering 
his prayers too completely.”
70
 Brzezinski’s conception of “peaceful engagement” was an 
offensive strategy to pry Poland from the grips of Soviet communism; however, his idea was 
based on a passive type of aggression which would enable his homeland to gradually detach 
from Moscow without bloodshed. What would unfold in 1979 through the end of 1980 was 
anything but safe for the people of Poland. Still, Brzezinski utilized every available option and 
skillfully prevented what could have become his worst nightmare. Indeed, while Nemesis was 
making plans for Brzezinski, Brzezinski flipped the situation and played his first of several aces 
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Chapter 3—A “Vietnamese Quagmire” Contingency and the Merging of Two Crises  
 The Soviet Union’s involvement in Afghanistan began in the 1950s when Afghani Prime 
Minister Mohammad Daoud Kahn, in an effort to counter U.S. arms shipments to Pakistan, 
reached out to Moscow to acquire economic and military aid through loans and gifts. But the 
extent of this overture was not limited to monetary help, as Russian became the technical 
language of the Afghan army and air force and many officers received “ideological 
indoctrination” in the USSR. These events were the catalysts that promoted discussion about 
communism among various groups that would subsequently form the People’s Democratic P arty 
of Afghanistan (PDPA). Conversely, the formation of a communist party also galvanized “those 
who rejected Marxism for Islamic religious reasons.” From these elements “emerged leaders of 
the major mujahideen organizations that fought the PDPA.”
71
 
 When Daoud was killed during the Great Saur Coup in 1978,
72
 Nur Mohammed Taraki, 
leader of the Khalq faction of the PDPA, and his deputy, Hafizullah Amin, rose to power and 
began to implement policies that the “Afghan people saw as violating both traditions and 
Quranic propriety.”
73
 Among these policies were “democratic land reforms, ensuring the equality 
of rights of women, and increasing the state sector of the national economy.”
74
 Uprisings 
occurred mainly due to the religious consequences of Taraki’s reforms, as it was clear that he 
had set an agenda to “clean Islam . . . of the ballast and dirt of bad traditions, superstition, and 
erroneous belief.”
75
 Despite the turmoil, Afghanistan remained relatively stable until a major 
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rebellion occurred in the city of Herat in March 1979.
76
 Following this uprising, Moscow reacted 
by sending hundreds of additional military advisers and extra equipment, while mandating that 
“all women and children of Soviets working outside Kabul” return to the USSR.
77
 
Perhaps as a result of the growing instability reverberating throughout the country, Amin 
resumed the responsibilities of prime minister, a position which Taraki had held along with his 
role as president. This “power swap” led many to believe that Taraki had been reduced to a 
figurehead in the relative calculation, but he continued to chair cabinet meetings and play a 
prominent role in Afghani affairs.
78
 Nevertheless, the situation was emblematic of the chaotic 
environment that gripped the country in the spring of 1979.     
 The Carter Administration had been monitoring Afghanistan closely since the beginning 
of the year, but the first tangible actions did not take place until CIA formulated a list of covert 
activity options and sent them to the SCC in March. The document from CIA explained that 
Moscow was concerned over recent developments because the insurgents had “achieved 
surprising successes.”
79
 General intelligence assessments also disclosed “unusual activity” in the 
form of two Soviet motorized rifle divisions garrisoned approximately six miles from the 
Afghani border, which in their normal capacity had been severely undermanned and “essentially 
dormant.” Yet by March both had received an “infusion of personnel,” prompting some analysts 
to characterize the development as “virtually unprecedented.”
80
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 On March 28 the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Soviet affairs, Arnold Horelick, 
forwarded to Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner a memo that described a number 
of possible scenarios before reaching the conclusion that the “Soviets may well be prepared to 
intervene.”
81
 Coinciding with Horelick’s prognostication, Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence Frank Carlucci learned that Pakistan might be willing to aid the Mujahideen with 
small arms and ammunition, but only if the U.S. also guaranteed a firm commitment to the 
operation. In Pakistan’s view, providing direct assistance without cover from Washington would 
not be worth the risk. Carlucci also learned that Saudi Arabia would be providing funds and 
might possibly attempt to help spur Pakistan into action.  
 Two days after the Horelick memo a “historic mini-SCC meeting” occurred. Here, 
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsome gave his view that the purpose of 
U.S. policy was to “reverse the current Soviet trend and presence in Afghanistan,” apprise the 
Pakistanis of U.S. concerns regarding Soviet involvement in the country, and to convey 
American resolve to allies in the region. At this point Walt Slocombe asked the provocative 
question if there was any “value” in “sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire?”
82
 He 
would later explain the exact meaning of his question: “Well, the whole idea was that if the 
Soviets decided to strike at this tar baby (Afghanistan) we had every interest in making sure that 
they got stuck. It would be costly to them. The Soviets would get a little sense of what it was like 
to be propping up an unpopular regime in the face of local opposition. Yes, it would be costly to 
them. It might discourage them from getting into anything in the future.”
83
 Les Gelb, who served 
as assistant secretary of state for political and military affairs in the Carter Administration, has 
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confirmed Slocombe’s assertion: “I don’t know anything about ‘luring’ them to invade. I was 
pretty much up on that situation. My job called for me to know about it. And even when I wasn’t 
involved, I was talking to people who were involved. . . I talked to Walt Slocombe ten times a 
week. . . We discussed everything we were doing with the Soviets and also with the Agency’s 
people. It’s not as if we provoked it. My memory is pretty clear on this.”
84
  
David Aaron, who chaired the March 30 mini-SCC meeting in Brzezinski’s absence, 
ended the discussion by asking the following question: “Is there interest in maintaining and 
assisting the insurgency, or is the risk that we will provoke the Soviets too great?” In his 
estimation, the U.S. needed to start a dialogue with other allies and offer a “limited commitment” 
if the decision was made to aid the Mujahideen.
85
 Aaron also believes that the information from 
the mini-SCC meeting would have reached the president: “He [Carter] would have been briefed 
by Zbigniew Brzezinski on this. And I would have briefed Brzezinski. The point of the SCC 
meeting was to in effect tell the agencies to tell their people to let it be known where they stand. 
Brzezinski sent a note every night to the president and met with him every morning. In one way 
or another, I’m sure that issue was addressed.”
86
 
 During the same month Brzezinski began to press Carter to publicly register the 
administration’s concerns over the Soviet’s “creeping intervention in Afghanistan,” and in 
several of the president’s national security briefings Brzezinski implored him to stand firm.
87
 To 
be sure, Brzezinski had been preoccupied with the public’s perception of Carter during the 
previous months which impelled the former to attach two negative news articles about the 
president to a memo. Writing in the Daily Telegraph, the author was direct: “All too frequently . 
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. . I have found myself criticizing President Carter for being weak and vacillating, for preaching 
too much and acting too little . . . Nor am I alone. Such complaints are widespread throughout 
Europe. . . America must rise from her Watergate-Vietnamese convalescence and resume the 
preponderant role in the world leadership which is her due and duty.” The second article 
appeared in the Economist and spoke of the “potential irrelevance of American power” if the 
U.S. could not “manage to deter the Russians.” Brzezinski concluded the memo to Carter by 
stating that “it is a fact that both abroad and increasingly at home the United States is seen as 
indecisive, vacillating, and pursuing a policy of acquiescence. We are perceived as neither 
responding effectively to Soviet assertiveness and as unable to generate a broad strategy that is 
relevant to the times.”
88
  
 On April 5 Horelick sent Turner another memo regarding U.S. covert planning and the 
possible reaction of such activities by the Kremlin. Horelick’s paper conveyed his opinion that 
covert action could not prevent the Soviets from keeping Taraki in power and U.S. meddling in 
the region would be used as a pretext by Moscow to deepen its involvement. His final analysis 
was that “covert action would raise the costs to the Soviets and inflame Muslim opinion against 
them in many countries,” but there was a risk that a “substantial U.S. covert aid program could 
raise the stakes and induce the Soviets to intervene more directly and vigorously than otherwise 
intended.” 
 The next day the SCC convened to discuss the menu of options on the table. Among 
these options were indirect financial assistance to the insurgents, direct financial assistance to 
Afghan émigré groups to support their anti-Soviet and anti-regime activities, non-lethal material 
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assistance, and weapons support.
89
 Brzezinski, with the help of Vice President Walter Mondale, 
was able to push the process along, although the State Department would rather have remained 
non-confrontational with the Soviets on such matters.
90
 The meeting ended with an agreement to 
fund the Mujahideen, but only to the extent of non-lethal assistance. CIA then prepared the 
covert directive for the president, and quickly returned it to the National Security Council 
(NSC).
91
   
 As David Aaron would recall, it was “odd” that the directive was agreed to in early April 
but was not acted upon for several weeks.
92
 Indeed, the situation in Afghanistan during this 
period had become increasingly worse for the Kremlin. Large-scale attacks against the 
government spread throughout seven provinces in May, with a number of Afghan army units 
deserting the regime to join the resistance fighters.
93
 The Washington Post summarized Soviet 
problems that month:   
The Soviet Union is clearly worried about getting bogged down in a Vietnam-
style quagmire in this rugged country where insurgents are killing dozens of their 
advisers. At the same time, the Soviets are reacting in almost the same way as the 
United States when it first got involved in Vietnam in the early 1960s. Top Soviet 
generals flew here last month to assess the situation, and soon after, Moscow 
poured in more arms to a government that has alienated vast numbers of its 
citizens and whose army is increasingly unwilling to fight. Diplomats here take it 
for granted that only Soviet economic, military, political and diplomatic support 
keeps the year-old Afghan government in power against the assault of Islamic-
oriented insurgents. “By the same token,” a diplomat said, “the Soviets' option to 
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Convinced already that Moscow would soon decide to intervene, Brzezinski warned 
Carter of the problems which could present themselves if the Soviets were successful in 
Afghanistan. The former hypothesized that a victory by Moscow would most likely “promote a 
separate Baluchistan” and give the Kremlin “access to the Indian Ocean while dismembering 
Pakistan and Iran.” Brzezinski also reminded the president of Russia’s “traditional push to the 
south.”
95
   
 Aware of the “turbulent situation” in Afghanistan, Carlucci recommended in the first 
days of June that the covert action finding be signed “expeditiously.”
96
 The insurgency by this 
point was “rapidly growing” and additional army desertions were now threatening Taraki’s 
ability to hold power.
97
 It was also becoming clear that the Soviets were being pushed to their 
limits, with Moscow warning Pakistan to “stop supporting anti-government rebels” or the 
Kremlin “could not remain indifferent to fighting on its own border.”
98
 But conditions were not 
only deteriorating throughout the countryside. Armed clashes between tribesmen and 
government officials in Kabul were occurring, sometimes catching Soviet officials in the 
crossfire.
99
 It was against this backdrop that the Carter Administration would finally approve the 
measures that would cement America’s role in Afghanistan for years to come.  
 At an SCC meeting on July 3 the president signed the covert finding to aid the 
Mujahideen. It included “support for insurgent propaganda and other psychologica l operations in 
Afghanistan, establishment of radio access to the Afghan population through third-country 
facilities and the provision either unilaterally or through third countries of support to the Afghan 
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insurgents in the form of cash or nonmilitary supplies.” In total, the presidential finding 
authorized only a little more than a half-million dollars to conduct these operations—a paltry 
amount of money and assistance to charge that the administration intentionally attempted to 
“suck the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire.”
100
 Nor is there any record to be found 
substantiating Le Nouvel Observateur’s claim that Brzezinski had sent a note to the president on 
July 3 stating that the “aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.” When asked later 
if it would have been better to provide a larger aid package, Brzezinski replied: 
I don’t think it would have made much of a difference. The Soviets were on a 
course which inevitably pointed towards the events that then transpired in 
December. In other words, their minds were pretty much made up. They thought 
that they could get into Afghanistan. They thought they could do it relatively 




In 1989, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Newsom confirmed that Brzezinski’s 
thoughts had already been formed prior to the covert finding: “Zbig wasn’t worried about 
provoking the Russians, as some of us were, because he expected them to take over anyway.”
102
 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
At the same time that Carter signed the secret finding in July 1979, another potential 
crisis was gaining significant steam in Poland. Now Brzezinski was faced with two potential 
crises situations, one much closer to his heart than the other. Unlike most other national security 
advisers, he asked for CIA’s raw intelligence reports on a regular basis so that he could assess 
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the information before it was broken down by analysts.
103
 In this particular case, Brzezinski had 
begun to receive “quite explicit signals” that the situation in his homeland was “deteriorating 
greatly” due to pro-Soviet interference in domestic problems, which was orchestrated by the 
Kremlin to keep “Warsaw dependent on Moscow.”
104
 
 Brzezinski’s secret source was Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski.
105
 Kuklinski had climbed the 
military ranks to a very sensitive position on the Polish General Staff and was responsible for 
providing the U.S. with “tens of thousands of pages of classified Soviet and Warsaw Pact 
documents.” As one intelligence operative recalled, his material was the “touchstone, the basic 
standard.”
106
 CIA officials at Langley personally carried Kuklinski’s reports to their destination, 
marking them with a wide blue stripe to indicate that the information emanated from a human 
source. In fact, the information was of such a sensitive nature that Colonel Kuklinski’s name 
never appeared on the documents and only a select few from the Agency ever knew it. 




Brzezinski would later confide that he really did not need the “explicit signals” provided 
by Kuklinski to form his impression of the volatile situation in Poland in 1979: “I didn’t have to 
be aware of any of the specifics. I had fresh in my mind the recollection of the [Soviet] 
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*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
Meanwhile, in Afghanistan the insurgents continued to battle the regime’s forces, 
prompting the government in Kabul to perform mass arrests while also killing many domestic 
instigators including some members of the Muslim clergy.
109
 Due to the circumstances, 
Brzezinski predicted to Carter on July 23 that it would probably be in the Kremlin’s interests to 
unseat Amin who had been closely associated with the repressive policies which were proving 
ineffective in Moscow’s view. Brzezinski also urged the president a second time to publicize the 




Nearing the end of that month, Pakistani President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq and his 
intelligence service (ISI) were separately insisting to U.S. officials to provide more equipment 
and arms to the Mujahideen. When word reached DCI Turner, he urged the Agency to quickly 
take action. CIA then supplied the resistance with communications equipment, lethal military 
provisions, and cash for the Pakistanis to acquire additional weapons for the fighters.
111
 
Brzezinski, by this point, could see that the situation had become “sufficiently grave.”
112
 While 
Taraki was on a visit to the Soviet Union in early September, General Secretary Brezhnev 
reportedly warned the Afghan leader that Amin was “plotting to destroy him,” and shortly after 
his return to Kabul this admonition proved to be true. Amin secretly imprisoned Taraki in the 
palace, and the former was granted the power of Secretary General of the PDPA.
113
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As a result of the continuing chaos, Brzezinski ordered his staff to formulate several 
contingency options for a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and sent Carter a five-page 
memorandum titled “Acquiescence vs. Assertiveness” in which he argued that there was an 
“increasingly pervasive feeling in the United States and abroad that in the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship the Soviets were becoming more aggressive and the United States more 
acquiescent.” In this regard, Brzezinski warned the president that the State Department had 
“through inaction or opposition diluted some of the President’s decisions designed to 
demonstrate American firmness.” He also recommended that Carter consider the “transfer of 
sensitive technology to China and. . . opening a military dialogue with the Chinese.”
114
 Clearly, 
Brzezinski was angered by the timid actions at State, but his use of the “China card” reflects that 
he was attempting to ensure that if the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, it would be their last stab at 
aggression for the foreseeable future. 
 To many in Afghanistan, the absence of Taraki from the scene was peculiar. When 
journalists asked Amin in late September of his whereabouts, he replied in broken English: 
“Definitely sick. Doctors treat him.” This provoked the Soviet embassy in Kabul to extend the 
offer to have Taraki treated for his illness in Moscow, but these officials were “rebuffed” by 
Amin and the Afghan government.
115
 
 Just days after the Amin interview, the State Department revealed in a press briefing that 
sources had detected “increased activity” in Soviet military preparations on the Afghan border, 
and the administration, albeit in a weak manner, voiced its “opposition to any intervention in 
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Afghan internal affairs.” Brzezinski then warned Carter that a Soviet invasion was certainly more 
probable at this point.  
  Turner, at the request of Brzezinski, was charged to prepare an analysis of “Soviet 
involvement to date,” thus allowing the White House to be able to “differentiate between 
creeping involvement and direct invasion.”
116
 Although the picture was still cloudy at this point, 
virtually all signals from the intelligence community led to one conclusion: Moscow was not 
happy with the internal tremors occurring in Afghanistan.  
Keeping a close eye on both crises, Brzezinski briefed Carter during September on events 
in Poland, as they appeared to be headed toward a “critical stage.” Here, he told the president 
that the latest developments indicated a “significant change in the Soviet world and a sign of 
decreasing Soviet control” is his native land.
117
 In recent weeks, demonstrations had erupted in 
Warsaw, but unlike most other previous protests, the people’s grievances by this time were not 
limited to economic considerations.
118
 
 At the end of that month, the analysis that Brzezinski had requested from Turner on 
Afghanistan was completed. It stated that “Moscow probably views the situation as even more 
unstable . . . [and] may fear that this coup [Amin’s power grab] might fragment the Afghan 
Army and lead to a breakdown of control in Kabul. The threat raised by the Muslim insurgency 
to the survival of the Marxist government in Afghanistan appears to be more serious now than at 
any time since the government assumed power in April 1978.”
119
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 During the second week of October, The Kabul Times reported that Taraki had died due 
to a “serious illness, which he had been suffering for some time,” but it later became public 
knowledge that Amin had, in fact, ordered two of his lieutenants to suffocate Taraki while he 
was tied up on a bed in the presidential palace. According to Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister 




 Coinciding with these developments, Brzezinski sent the director of the U.S. International 
Communication Agency the following memo to reinforce the belief that the growing Soviet 
involvement in Afghanistan warranted a high level of coverage around the world: “USICA’s 
handling of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan as reported in your memo of October 10, 
1979 has been commendable and is indicative of a keen understanding within the agency of the 
importance of this issue. As Soviet involvement continues, your agency should take positive 
steps to ensure that there be the high level of coverage demanded by the situation, including 




 The next week an entire Afghan infantry division mutinied and marched toward Kabul 
for an attack, with the affair ending only after several days of intense combat in the nation’s 
capital. U.S. intelligence agents interpreted this event as particularly alarming to Moscow, and 
shortly afterward the Soviet military took a “number of major steps” regarding their combat 
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readiness on the Afghan border. Another assessment late that month concluded that “without 
Soviet support, the [Afghan] Army would have collapsed a long time ago.”
122
  
 By early December, a National Intelligence Daily (NID) was disseminated in Washington 
that alerted the administration that a second Soviet airborne battalion had arrived at Bagram 
airfield in Afghanistan. The report also noted that these developments could be “indicative of a 
decision by the Soviets to increase their forces substantially.”
123
 At mid-month, the intelligence 
community divulged that two Soviet divisions had been brought to full strength, and an alarming 
number of combat helicopters, fighters, fighter-bombers, light bombers, and other aircraft were 
massing in the nearby Turkestan Military District of the USSR.
124
 Brzezinski acted by requesting 
that a “sanitized” version of the intelligence reports be delivered to Carter so that the 
administration could release the information to the public.
125
 At an SCC meeting on December 
17, Turner delivered the following assessment to Brzezinski, Mondale, Brown, Deputy Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  
CIA does not see this as a crash buildup but rather as a steady, planned buildup, 
perhaps related to Soviet perceptions of a deterioration of the Afghan military 
forces and the need to beef them up at some point. ... We believe that the Soviets 
have made a political decision to keep a pro-Soviet regime in power and to use 
military force to that end if necessary. They either give this a higher priority than 




The SCC participants then decided that the administration would explore additional options, in 
conjunction with the Pakistanis and the British, to provide enhancement aid to the Mujahideen 
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by way of funds, weapons, and communications equipment to “make it as expensive as possible 
for the Soviets to continue their efforts.” 
 Counter to Brzezinski’s wishes, the SCC, according to Doug MacEachin, also concluded 
that the U.S. would keep its dissatisfaction with Soviet moves in private channels, with some 
believing that “there was no benefit in going public” at that time.
127
 Brzezinski contends, 
however, that during the same meeting the SCC approved a formal recommendation to the 
president to begin publicizing Soviet involvement.
128
 Regardless, it is clear that Brzezinski’s 
preference was to register their concerns in a public fashion, and the administration finally did 
this on December 21.
129
 
 The day following the administration’s first public statements that alerted the public to 
Moscow’s aggression, National Security Agency Director Vice Admiral Bobby Ray Inman 
called Brzezinski and Brown to tell them that there was “no doubt” an invasion of Afghanistan 
would commence in the next seventy-two hours. On Christmas Eve Inman telephoned the two 
again stating that the move would begin within the next fifteen hours.
130
 Then on Christmas night 
1979 a massive wave of Soviet forces flooded into the country, with a vast majority of these 
operations originating from the Turkestan Military District. Here, there was little doubt that the 
formal invasion of Afghanistan had begun.
131
  
Amidst the chaos that ensued in Kabul over the next two days, Amin was reportedly 
killed by grenade fragments as Soviet troops entered the palace, but it is also known that an 
                                              
127
 Ibid., Note 111. 
128
 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 428. 
129
 MacEachin, Predicting the Soviet Invasion, Note 117. 
130
 Ibid., Note 118. 
131
 Ibid., Note 120. 
42 
 
attacker shot him, as well, to ensure that his reign would not endure.
132
During these tense days, 
Radio Kabul announced that Babrak Karmal had assumed the roles of general secretary of the 
PDPA and president.  
 On December 26, Brzezinski sprang to action early that morning to convene a “crisis 
management” SCC meeting where he proposed that the president convey to the Soviets that the 
SALT agreement was in jeopardy and their actions would have a certain impact on the U.S.-
Chinese relationship. As usual, those representing the State Department, specifically Secretary 
Cyrus Vance and Warren Christopher, were strenuously opposed to his suggestions.
133
 
Brzezinski also sent Carter a memorandum on that day to put the invasion in perspective. He 
noted that the “Soviet intervention poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both 
internationally and domestically. While it could become a Soviet Vietnam, the initial effects of 
the intervention are likely to be adverse;” therefore, “we should not be too sanguine about 
Afghanistan becoming a Soviet Vietnam.” After explaining to the president that the Mujahideen 
fighters were “badly organized” and had “limited foreign support” in comparison to the 
Vietnamese insurgency, Brzezinski stated that it was “essential” that the Afghani resistance 
continue, which meant that it was imperative that the U.S. supply them with “more money as 
well as arms shipments.”
134
 
On December 28 a formal NSC meeting was held at the White House. Carter adamantly 
explained to the participants that he wanted a stern message sent directly to Brezhnev, but by this 
point Brzezinski was not at all sure that the U.S. could demonstrate a credible response after the 
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timidity displayed by the administration during the Ogaden crisis in Africa.
135
 The next day 
Brzezinski sent the president another memo where he outlined the American response to the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, informing Carter that his administration had “not 
always followed up . . . verbal protests with tangible responses.” Brzezinski continued, “The 
Soviets may be getting into the habit of disregarding our concern.”
136
 
Over the next several days the administration set out to punish the Soviets for their 
reckless actions by adopting crippling sanctions. These sanctions included an embargo on new 
grain sales to Moscow, banning the sale of high-technology equipment, restricting Soviet fishing 
privileges in American waters, postponing the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York, 
and the U.S. withdrawal from the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. In addition, Carter made the 
request to Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-WV) to withdraw the SALT treaty from 
consideration in the Senate.
137
 
Brzezinski, in a strange twist, was not as forceful as the State Department regarding the 
list of sanctions. According to Carter, during this period he was “remarkably sober, concerned 
about future relationships with the Soviet Union.”
138
 When later asked about his behavior on this 
issue, Brzezinski stated:  
First of all, I was in favor of opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan, and my record 
on that subject was quite clear-cut. I thought we should do it, and I was consistent 
from the very beginning. The State Department, however, flipped. At first they 
didn’t want to make any public warnings to the Soviets and acted in a way that the 
State Department ultimately felt that they would not act. The State Department 
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Certainly, it is highly peculiar that Brzezinski, who had been the most hard-line opponent of the 
Soviets within the administration, chose at that point to assume the role of a “dove” in the 
relative calculation. 
 As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the president issued what would later 
become known as the “Carter Doctrine” during his 1980 State of the Union Address. It 
essentially declared that any “foreign attempt to take over control of the Persian Gulf area would 
be a direct threat to the vital interests of the United States and would be met with armed military 
force.”
140
 At first glance it appears that Carter had finally decided to get tough with the Soviet 
Union, but, according to Brzezinski, much of the Doctrine was for political purposes.
141
 Bob 
Shrum, campaign manager for Senator Edward M. “Teddy” Kennedy’s primary challenge to 
Carter in 1980, agreed with Brzezinski’s analysis: “Carter was so battered at that point. They felt 
they couldn’t admit he wasn’t strong enough to do something about it [invasion of Afghanistan], 
so the easier thing was to . . . draw a line in the sand by issuing the Carter Doctrine.”
142
 At the 
time that the president issued his forceful warning to Moscow in January, public approval of the 
administration’s handling of Soviet affairs was at a dismal 37 percent.
143
 Thus, in all probability, 
Carter’s newly found bravado vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was little more than a last-ditch effort 
to save a weak and crumbling presidency.  
 Directly following the crisis Brzezinski wrote the following passage in his diary: 
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Had we been tougher sooner, had we drawn the line more clearly, had we engaged 
in the kind of consultations that I had so many times advocated, maybe the 
Soviets would not have engaged in this act of miscalculation. As it is, American-
Soviet relations will have been set back for a long time to come. What was done 
[referring to the Carter Doctrine] had to be done, but it would have been better if 





 These words appeared in Brzezinski’s memoirs which were published in 1982—a full sixteen 
years before the interview with Le Nouvel Observateur. Moreover, NIO Horelick, in his memo to 
DCI Tuner on April 5, had warned that there was a “risk that a substantial U.S. covert aid 
program could raise the stakes and induce the Soviets to intervene more directly and vigorously 
than otherwise intended,”
145
 and the administration followed his advice , approving on July 3 
what can be characterized as the smallest acceptable package—void of any lethal provisions.  
Throughout 1979 it is clear that Zbigniew Brzezinski did not attempt to induce a Soviet 
intervention of Afghanistan. In fact, at every conceivable turn he pressed Carter to be more 
forceful and assertive with Moscow to prevent an invasion, but his concerns obviously went 
unheeded. Early that year Brzezinski had already made up his mind that Soviet aggressiveness in 
the Horn of Africa coupled with the Shah of Iran’s fall made it almost inevitable that Moscow 
would protect its interests in Afghanistan. Therefore, he simply devised a strategy which would 
serve to hold the Soviet Army in check once the Kremlin embarked on such a course. This 
strategy is evidenced by Brzezinski’s post-invasion memos to Carter where the former calls for 
additional aid to bolster the Mujahideen. As Robert Gates would later recall, “No one in the 
Carter Administration wanted the Soviets to invade Afghanistan and no one, as I can recall at 
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least, ever advocated attempting to induce them to invade. . . Only after the Soviet invasion did 
some advocate making the Soviets ‘bleed’ in their own Vietnam.”
146
 
Concerning Poland, the information that Brzezinski received at the time is very limited 
due to the fact that CIA still refuses to release Kuklinski’s correspondence with the White House 
during this period. Brzezinski will not speak of it, either; he maintains only that it played a 
substantial role in his need to ensure that the Soviets would get the ir Vietnam if they decided to 
invade Afghanistan. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Brzezinski was highly aware of the 
internal dynamics unfolding in Warsaw throughout 1979, which he illustrated by labeling the 
situation in Poland as “critical.” But what was actually happening in Brzezinski’s homeland in 
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Chapter 4—Hidden History: The Polish Uprising of 1979 
Foreshadowing the well-documented problems that would consume the country a year 
later, Poland’s economic disposition by the spring of 1979 was already one of chaos, with those 
close to the situation “aware that an unavoidable catastrophe was approaching.”
147
 In the latter 
half of the 1970s, First Secretary Edward Gierek’s inability to adjust consumer prices amidst a 
rapidly declining economy and a “ballooning” national debt were instrumental factors in the 
formation of strong opposition groups such as the Worker’s Defense Committee (KOR) and the 
Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO).
148
 KOR co-founder Jacek 
Kuron, writing in Poland’s Information Bulletin, put these realities in perspective as early as 
April 1979:  
The basic premise of these thoughts is the fear that we are threatened by an 
explosion of social anger greater than those [in Poland] of June 1956, March 
1968, December 1970, and June 1976, taken together. Such an explosion can very 
easily become a national tragedy (the probability of a Soviet military 
intervention). . . I do not doubt that all of us consider riots as an evil which we 
should try to prevent. Regardless of the threat of Soviet intervention, the Polish 
authorities—as was proven in December 1970—will not recoil from homicide, 




Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine, upon his return from a swing through Europe in early 
May, wrote Carter a memo outlining his thoughts regarding the situation in Poland: “I perceive 
the Polish leadership is deeply concerned about a Czech-type Soviet move [invasion]. This 
concern is shared by the Archbishop and others. . . . I perceive this current leadership seriously 
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 If Polish leaders were “threatened by an explosion of social anger” and worried about a 
“Czech-type Soviet move” by May, John Paul II’s arrival in Warsaw on June 2, 1979 would 
accelerate events considerably. In what has been described as a “speech to overthrow 
communism in Eastern Europe,”
151
 the Pope did not mince words in his first address and gave 
the people a reason to hope for a free nation:  
It is impossible without Christ to understand this nation with its past so full of 
splendour and also of terrible difficulties. It is impossible to understand this city, 
Warsaw, the capital of Poland, that undertook in 1944 an unequal battle against 
the aggressor, a battle in which it was abandoned by the allied powers, a battle in 
which it was buried under its own ruins—if it is not remembered that under those 
same ruins there was also the statue of Christ the Saviour with his cross that is in 
front of the church at Krakowskie Przedmiescie. . . My prayer of thanksgiving 
together with all of you, dear fellow-countrymen, to whom Christ does not cease 
to teach the great cause of man; together with you, for whom Jesus Christ does 
not cease to be an ever open book on man, his dignity and his rights and also a 
book of knowledge on the dignity and rights of the nation. Today, here in Victory 
Square, in the capital of Poland, I am asking with all of you, through the great 
Eucharistic prayer, that Christ will not cease to be for us an open book of life for 
the future [emphasis added], for our Polish future. We are before the tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier. In the ancient and contemporary history of Poland this tomb 
has a special basis, a special reason for its existence. In how many places in our 
native land has that soldier fallen! In how many places in Europe and the world 
has he cried with his death that there can be no just Europe without the 
independence of Poland marked on its map! On how many battlefields has that 
solider given witness to the rights of man, indelibly inscribed in the inviolable 
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At the conclusion of John Paul II’s nine-day voyage, Poland had become “two different 
countries.”
153
 Or, as political scientist Bogdan Szajkowski has described it, the country 
experienced a “psychological earthquake, an opportunity for mass political catharsis.”
154
 
Brezhnev had forewarned Gierek of the disastrous consequences which could arise from the 
visit: “Take my advice,” he said. “It will only cause trouble. . .  . Tell the Pope—he’s a wise 
man—he can declare publicly that he can’t come due to an illness.” But Gierek resisted 
Brezhnev’s suggestions : “I’m sorry, Comrade Leonid,” he said. “I can’t do this. I have to 
welcome John Paul II.”
155
  
 In the bigger picture for communism, Brezhnev was correct in his reluctance to receive 
the Pope. Essentially everyone in Poland heard John Paul II’s message via either radio or 
television, but what was striking is that thirteen million citizens—roughly one-third of the 
country’s population—witnessed the Pontiff with their own eyes in various cities.
156
 On the final 
day of his Polish homecoming, it has been estimated that John Paul II drew a crowd of two to 
three million people while speaking at the Blonie meadow just outside of Krakow proper. Here, 
his message extended past the borders of Poland: “There is no need to be afraid. The frontiers 
must be opened. There is no imperialism in the Church, only service. . .  . Oh how I would wish 
that our brothers and sisters, who are untied to us by language and the fortunes of history, could 
also have been present during the pilgrimage of this Slavic pope. If they are not here, if they are 
not here in this vast expanse, they are surely in our hearts.”
157
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 John Paul II articulated what Poles and others behind the Iron Curtain had wanted to say 
for years. Over the past decades, communism had ostensibly transformed the mindset of a proud 
people into that of a lethargic and detached population, yet he was able to revitalize hope in just 
nine days.
158
 Jerzy Turowicz, a publisher and intellectual, was present on the last day of the 
Pope’s voyage and summed it up later as such: “Historians say World War II ended in 1945. 
Maybe in the rest of the world, but not in Poland. They say communism fell in 1989. Not in 
Poland.  World War II and communism both ended in Poland at the same time—in 1979, when 
John Paul II came home.”
159
   
 In July, just over a month following the Pope’s visit, a demonstration erupted at the 
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier where thousands of Poles poured into the streets after Mass to 
commemorate the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 and to demand the return of a number of historical 
tablets which served to honor the “struggles of Polish soldiers during World War I and during the 
Polish-Soviet War of 1920.”
160
 Only the specific tablets honoring the Polish-Soviet War had 
been removed by the communists,
161
 but the act was of such symbolic significance to the Poles 
that it stirred heavy emotions. Speaking to the crowd, Wojiech Ziembinski, a founding member 
of KOR, addressed the issue: 
We are standing in front of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier—before the Tomb 
which the occupiers damaged but will never be able to destroy. German enemy 
tanks came through here. Other unworthy hands removed the tablets bearing the 
names of battlefields of World War I and the Russian-Polish War of 1919-20. We 
demand the return of those tablets, commemorating the glory of Polish arms.
162
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  In early August 1979 Brzezinski gave a speech to the International Platform Association 
in Washington in which, according to the New York Times, he had “indirectly” warned Moscow 
to refrain from its efforts to “impose alien doctrines on countries with deeply religious or 
nationalistic peoples.” The Times also reported that the “pro-USSR Afghan government was near 
collapse” in the face of “widespread Islamic opposition and open rebellion by anti-communist 
tribesman.”
163
 Interestingly, in the speech Brzezinski did not link Afghanistan to his quotes, but 
the Times assumed that his remarks were intended specifically for , and limited to, that country. 
In reality, Brzezinski’s veiled warnings were most probably also geared to Poland, as the 
reference to “deeply religious and nationalistic peoples” would have been a fairly accurate 
description of his native land, as well.  
Approximately a month afterward, about a thousand individuals bearing wreaths, flags, 
and torches again gathered at the Tomb of the Soldier. Yet on this occasion a ROPCiO activist 
spoke of the tragedy of Poland being wedged between two “enormous totalitarian states.” If 
these were not sufficient symbolic indications of the direction of things within the country, KOR 
issued the following statement the same month regarding the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland: 
The Social Self-Defense Committee “KOR” proclaims that to this day the 
government of the USSR has not acknowledged that the Stalinist regime of the 
USSR was guilty of the crimes of genocide . . . and has not tried to prosecute 
those who were responsible. Similarly, the government of the PRL (People’s 
Republic of Poland) has not attempted to clarify the issue of Katyn and other 
Soviet crimes. On the contrary, it has used all the means as its disposal to prevent 
the truth from becoming public. The directive issued by the Main Office for 
Control of the Press, Publications, and Performances which prohibits any mention 
of the Katyn murders in the press and in other publications can serve as one 
example of this. In this manner, according to the criminal law binding in the PRL, 
the Polish government bears a share of the responsibilities for the crime of 
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concealing and preventing attempts to gather evidence and to bring to justice 




By late summer the “tremors of change” in Warsaw were visually evident: “Buildings 
and walls were covered with slogans heralding resistance,” Benjamin Weiser notes, paraphrasing 
the recollection of former CIA officer Michael Dwyer. “Many signs displayed a ‘P’ 
superimposed on a ‘W’ for ‘Polska Walczaca’ (Fighting Poland), the symbol of the Polish Home 
Army. . . . Some of the slogans were quickly painted over by the Communists, but the paint 
never seemed to hold in the rain, and the slogans reappeared. On September 17, the fortieth 
anniversary of the Soviet invasion, Dwyer and a colleague drove past the Russian trade mission 
in Warsaw, where someone had scaled a thirty-foot wall in front and painted in large Polish 
letters ‘We will never forget.’”
165
 
In point of fact, the still-classified intelligence reports from Kuklinski to Brzezinski are 
not needed to grasp that the mounting frustrations in Poland were reaching a boiling point long 
before Solidarity took shape, roughly a year after these events. Historians and political scientists 
tend to describe Brzezinski’s association with events in Afghanistan with an exclusionary type of 
“tunnel vision,” but, again, he was not focused on a singular purpose during most of 1979. 
 Although the situation in Afghanistan continued its downward spiral and the U.S. 
embassy in Tehran had been seized by radicals, there is no doubt that Brzezinski was still closely 
monitoring the deteriorating conditions in Poland, as Gierek’s economy certa inly appeared that it 
was headed toward a collapse and protests were growing larger.
166
 On November 11, KOR and 
ROPCiO organized a demonstration which gathered yet again at the Tomb of the Unknown 
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Soldier. Another group, the Confederation of Independent Poland, was also represented by a 
speaker at the event.
167
  Reuters reported that “Five thousand Poles marched in torchlight 
procession through the streets of Warsaw . . . to mark the officially ignored 61
st
 anniversary of 
Polish independence. They also applauded appeals by dissidents to boycott elections next year. . . 
. The march, with banners calling for Polish freedom and independence, was the fourth such 
demonstration over the past year.”
168
 On this occasion, however, the Polish Security Service 
“conducted fifty searches (including two police traps), detained eighty-four people, seventy-five 
of whom were detained for forty-eight hours or longer, used tear gas on two occasions, and beat 
eleven people.”
169
 As tensions mounted, Brzezinski felt that the situation had become dire 
enough to warrant an SCC meeting specifically addressing the issues in Poland.
170
 
 In early December, Brzezinski received a memorandum from Paul Henze which outlined 
a meeting that the latter had arranged with Polish official Bohdan Lewandowsky. Henze wrote:  
He [Lewandowsky] went on to the most interesting part of the conversation in 
which he recalled that it was his conviction that the outcome of events in Hungary 
in 1956 would have been very different (more like Poland) if the Soviets had not 
been able to take advantage of the Franco-British attack on Suez to cover their 
suppression of Hungary. At present there was growing fear in Poland, he said, that 
the Soviets might want to take advantage of the U.S. preoccupation with Iran and 
other Middle Eastern crises to move against liberalizers in Poland. He and others 
feared, he said, that the Soviets might even provoke some sort of diwersja 
[diversion] as a cover for their move—arguing that they were forestalling a 
Western plot. He often wondered, he said, whether there might not be some 
element in the U.S. government—CIA, e.g.—that might undertake some move in 
Eastern Europe at a time such as this. That would be most unfortunate because 





                                              
167
 Lipski, KOR, 350. 
168
 Reuters, “Poles Mark Anniversary with March,” November 12, 1979. 
169
 Lipski, KOR, 349. 
170
 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 464. 
171
 Memo, Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, December 4, 1979, Declassified Documents Reference System. 
54 
 
On December 18 yet another mass demonstration took place in Poland where 
approximately seven thousand demonstrators gathered at the Gdansk shipyard to commemorate 
the massacre of 1970. As the publication Robotnik noted, “People who had been actively 
engaged in oppositional work felt that their ranks had grown many times over. Both familiar and 




 Prior to this protest many Poles feared that Lech Walesa, both the future leader of 
Solidarity and president of Poland, would be arrested and, in turn, not be available to speak at the 
wreath-laying ceremony, but the organizers devised a clever plan to sneak him into the event in a 
transport container.
173
 Speaking to the masses of activists who stood with torches in hand at the 
shipyard gate, he said: 
My name is Lech Walesa. I am one of those who formulated and bear the 
responsibility for the slogan “We will help.” I was a member of the first and 
second strike committees in December 1970. Today I am in the same situation as 
all of us who have gathered here. We do not have the monument which Gierek 
promised us in the shipyard. We must hide and force our way in order to be 




The Polish Security Services did not interfere with the protest that day, but a wave of arrests and 
searches had occurred in the preceding days to diminish its intensity.
175
 Certainly, it is apparent 
that many individuals had failed to gauge the momentous (and dangerous) nature of the events in 
Poland throughout 1979 and their integral connection with the Solidarity movement which 
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exploded in 1980. But at least one individual did see this connection at an early stage. His name 
is Zbigniew Brzezinski.  
Brzezinski was superbly educated on past Soviet incursions into Eastern European 
countries, yet paradoxically, his knowledge of these accounts could have done more to cloud the 
situation in 1979 rather than to clarify it. For example, when labor unrest broke out in Poland in 
June 1956, the Soviets did not intervene at that very moment. Moscow waited approximately five 
months—after all appeared calm—before using its armed forces to apply pressure to Warsaw. 
That same year Moscow waited some four months after the initiation of political reforms in 
Hungary before staging an invasion. And finally, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 
essentially followed the same path. On this occasion, the Kremlin again waited four months 
before it sent roughly 400,000 Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops to squelch the liberal political 
reforms of Alexander Dubcek in Prague.
176
 Thus, a historical precedent had been set regarding 
Soviet maneuvering in Eastern Europe; nevertheless, Brzezinski most likely had a very difficult 
time gauging the relevance of the demonstrations in Poland and how they ultimately figured into 
the Soviet military calculus. For all he knew, an invasion of his homeland could take place even 
after the situation had calmed considerably. As it has been shown, the situation was far from 
calm in Poland throughout 1979.  
 One might counter-argue—quite reasonably—that Brzezinski could not have possibly 
devised a contingency strategy to protect Poland by keeping Moscow bogged down in 
Afghanistan due to the fact that he never wanted the Soviets to invade the latter. This line of 
reasoning is flawed, however. When the first known intelligence reports were coming into the 
White House from Colonel Kuklinski in mid-1979 (presumably by April), Brzezinski was not 
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certain that the Soviet Union would not plot to invade both countries using a combination of 
troop levels at various intervals. He felt, first and foremost, that a firm and unyielding policy vis-
à-vis Moscow might possibly convince the Soviets that their relationship with the U.S. would 
suffer in dramatic fashion if either country was invaded. Moreover, in all likelihood Brzezinski’s 
insistence that Carter publicly stand firm with Moscow on Afghanistan was an all-encompassing 
strategic maneuver to prevent Soviet aggressiveness, in general. Again, the notion of “sucking 
the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire” was only a contingency option if the Kremlin continued 
to disregard Washington’s protestations regarding Soviet aggressiveness around the globe.  
 Another counter-argument, although somewhat weaker, is that Brzezinski appeared to 
turn “dovish” when the State Department recommended the strongest of sanctions following the 
invasion of Afghanistan, thus indicating that he was not interested in punishing Moscow to the 
extent where it would feel obliged to limit its aggressive behavior. In this case, though, 
Brzezinski most likely calculated that a list of sanctions too severe would cause the Kremlin to 
feel that it had nothing to lose in its relationship with the U.S. He estimated that there was an 
optimum level of punishment which might have enticed Moscow to stop its probing and change 




In retrospect, only the situation in Afghanistan was on the verge of exploding in the latter 
part of 1979, but for all intents and purposes, Brzezinski believed during those tense months that 
both were possibly on the precipice of calamity. It is clear that Brzezinski was abreast of the 
volatile situation in Poland at least three months before Carter signed the covert aid for 
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Afghanistan. Kuklinski, in addition, had been a secret operative for the U.S. since the early 
1970s; therefore, the intelligence infrastructure would have been securely in place.
178
 In the 
event that an extended lag in the flow of information from Kuklinski to the White House existed 
during that timeframe, the events that were unfolding in the spring and summer of 1979 were 
ones which could not have been hidden by the communist government in Warsaw. 
 The Pope’s visit to Poland—a full month before Carter signed the covert finding for the 
Mujahideen—had turned the country on its head. Brzezinski later recalled: “The dominant mood 
until then was the inevitability of the existing system. After he left the dominant mood was the 
non-inevitability of the existing system. I think that was a fundamental transformation.”
179
 As a 
result of the tremendous upheaval in Poland in 1979, Brzezinski felt that the Soviets could not be 
allowed to waltz through Afghanistan without a tough American response or it might lead to 
grave consequences for his native land. The extent of his correspondence with John Paul II 
during this time is not known and may never be released by CIA due to its sensitive nature, but, 
clearly, a connection existed between the two which was significantly more than a “religious” 
relationship.  
As the Administration moved past the president’s State of the Union address in January 
1980 and toward the implementation of sanctions on the Soviet Union for invading Afghanistan, 
it appeared that the world was producing one crisis after another for Brzezinski. In late April the 
White House received the tragic news that the attempt to rescue the American hostages held in 
Tehran had failed. As a result, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigned due to his strenuous 
opposition to the mission from its conception. Vance was then replaced by the aforementioned 
                                              
178
 Weiser, A Secret Life, 5. 
179






 These events shared center-stage with the continuing destabilization of 
Poland—by this time a full-blown crisis but one which Brzezinski had been monitoring and 
labeling as such for at least the past year.  
As noted above, the Kremlin had established a pattern of delaying military action for 
months before moving to crush independence movements in Eastern Europe. From that fact, 
coupled with the Muskie memo to Carter in early May, there is a distinct possibility that 
Brzezinski thought that the Kremlin was already planning an invasion of Poland by the summer 
of 1979 but did not record it in his memoirs due to the fact that it did not materialize at that point. 
In essence, some historic events never become a part of the dominant historical narrative because 
something more important occurs at a later date which renders these events minimal in the 
relative calculation. In this case, the events of 1979 in Brzezinski’s homeland have for years 
been overshadowed by what has been called the “Soviet non-invasion of Poland” in late 1980. 
The next chapter will show that Brzezinski displayed a steely, almost obsessive 
determination to prevent this catastrophe from taking place, with his efforts throughout 1980 
aided considerably by the “Vietnamese quagmire” contingency option for Afghanistan that he 
had formulated several months beforehand. As the saying goes, sometimes the best laid plans of 
mice and men go awry. But for Zbigniew Brzezinski this was certainly not the case. His 
prescient observation that Moscow would have its hands full with the Mujahideen was perhaps 
the best bet that he made in his fours years as national security adviser to the president.      
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Chapter 5—Anything for the Homeland 
 According to Lech Walesa, the “decisive moment” for the worker’s uprising which 
would later become known as Solidarity materialized on May 3, 1980 when the Young Poland 
Movement (RMP) and ROPCiO distributed some twenty-thousand leaflets demanding that the 
government recognize individual rights, move toward economic reform, and put an end to price 
increases and inflation.
181
 On that day the church Mass in Gdansk witnessed fifteen-thousand 
Poles in attendance, where approximately half of them later marched to the monument of King 
John III and listened to numerous opposition leaders rally the crowds. At the conclusion of the 
ceremonies the Polish Security Services beat then arrested several of the protesters.
182
 Although 
these events were an ominous precursor, the situation would become much worse.  
 Acting in a manner diametric to the opposition’s demands on May 3, the Polish 
government announced on July 1 that it had raised the price of meat and other consumer goods 
by sixty to ninety percent. This act spurred mass demonstrations and strikes throughout the 
country in which Poles adamantly counterclaimed that the price hikes must be accompanied by 
commensurate wage increases.
183
 Ironically, these price increases were inextricably linked with 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent embargo implemented by the Carter 
Administration. Here, Western banks began to reduce the amount of credit available to Eastern 
European states due to heightened political risks after the intervention, and, secondly, Moscow 
exacerbated the situation by refusing to aid Poland with grain sales. In essence, the Western 
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financial community exerted pressure on the Polish government by suggesting that it raise the 
price of goods to alleviate concerns.
184
 
 The government by mid-month had achieved some modest success combating the strikes 
by offering to increase wages by ten to fifteen percent to various groups, but as one dispute was 
settled another began, mainly as a product of KOR’s ability to spread information throughout the 
country to those workers who had not received any additional compensation. In Lublin, a city 
located at the crossroads of the rail links between the Soviet Union and East Germany, the strikes 
were expanded to include many demands beyond commensurate wage increases. In fact, the 
workers at a truck factory submitted a list of thirty-five appeals including freedom of the press, 
and when the Polish authorities responded by only raising wages, the railway workers in that city 
shut down the transportation lines. This development was the main factor which caused the 
government to send Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Jagielski to negotiate a settlement.
185
      
 On July 19 Brzezinski received an Alert Memorandum issued by CIA. The intelligence 
assessment noted that at least some of the negotiated settlements between the workers and 
management were beginning to come “unglued,” and that the intensity of these strikes could 
cause the situation to quickly devolve into a “violent confrontation” with the government. A few 
days later, the turbulent environment in Poland diminished significantly, prompting many within 
the Carter Administration to “relax.” It is certain, however, that Brzezinski was not included in 
this group as he had witnessed the ebb and flow of disturbances in his homeland for quite some 
time and was keenly aware that this cessation of activities was by no means permanent.
186
 
Brzezinski understood that the problems were systemic and indicative of a general feeling 
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throughout the country that Gierek’s communist government was corrupt, incompetent, and had 
abused its power far too many times.
187
 
 Perhaps as a result of the government’s willingness to use brutal force in the recent past, 
many workers in Gdansk were reluctant to join the strikers who had committed to the resistance 
in other areas of the country.
188
 However, on August 9 a popular worker at the Lenin Shipyard 
was fired on the pretext that she had been a primary force behind efforts to erect a monument to 
the protesters who were killed during the strikes of 1970.
189
 After almost a week of rising 
tensions over her termination, a massive strike then erupted in Gdansk on August 14 where an 
estimated 100,000 workers demanded that the Polish government raise wages and allow the 
people to begin work on the proposed monument. But, more importantly, the demonstrators also 




 Following his leadership role in December 1979, Lech Walesa again delivered a rousing 
speech to the crowd which played a significant role in transforming a general strike into a 
worker’s occupation of the Lenin Shipyard. Two days later, the protesters formed the 
Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS) and on August 18 released a comprehensive communiqué 
consisting of twenty-one demands. This list of ultimatums included the right to form independent 
and free trade unions, the guaranteed right to strike, the right to free speech and to print 
independent publications, freedom for political prisoners, and the restoration of employment to 
those workers who had been unfairly dismissed. From this it became clear that the strikes which 
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had initially only called for a few concessions from the Polish government had evolved into a 
mission to overturn the entire existing structure.
191
 
The latest U.S. intelligence reports had concluded that “while the Polish regime was 
willing to offer concessions on purely economic issues like wages, prices and working conditions 
if this would diffuse the crisis, the leadership would not give ground on the demands that were 
seen as crossing into the political sphere. Free trade unions in particular were politically 
unacceptable.”
192
 By this point Brzezinski believed that a “national resurgence” was occurring in 
his homeland, and he was determined to prevent a passive U.S. response like that of Lyndon 
Johnson’s Administration during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. On August 25 
Brzezinski succeeded in getting Carter to contact Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain, 
President Giscard of France, Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany, and the Pope in order to 
coordinate a common Western strategy relating to the crisis in Poland and warn them of a 
possible Soviet intervention. This outreach effort led to direct consultations between the State 




During this time the MKS affiliate in Gdansk issued the first publication of “Solidarity,” 
a bulletin (and a meaningful word) that would later represent the entire movement in Poland. The 
government balked initially at requests to negotiate with the workers, but as conditions 
deteriorated Jagielski was sent to engage in direct talks with MKS leaders. This change in 
government policy inadvertently created a de facto recognition of the latter’s authority and the 
labor movement, in general. Closely following this development, a major shakeup occurred in 
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the communist party apparatus in which several top officials were replaced in the Central 
Committee and Politburo due to their obstructive views in effectively dealing with the workers. 
Although U.S. intelligence analysts noted that the regime was moving toward the “moderate and 
pragmatic end of the political spectrum” in light of these changes, most remained skeptical that 
these internal reconfigurations would serve to quell the crisis.
194
 
On August 29, acting National Intelligence Officer (NIO) Robert Dean sent DCI Turner a 
memorandum which hypothesized that events in Poland were heading toward a “decisive phase,” 
noting specifically that the continuing demonstrations could possibly lead to a “nationwide work 
stoppage.” The memo also predicted that any government concessions on Warsaw’s behalf 
regarding free trade unions might decrease the communist party’s monopoly of power and “set 
the stage for the evolution of a pluralistic system.”
195
  
Two days after Turner received this information, Jagielski and Walesa signed the historic 
Gdansk Agreement thereby committing the regime to all twenty-one demands of the MKS. As 
one intelligence analyst noted, this landmark accommodation offered the workers a “chance to 
institutionalize their right to represent the industrial work force of Poland over the longer term” 
and would “usher in a period of political turmoil that could last for years.” In addition, the New 
York Times expressed that the “idea of independent unions and the right to strike [in a Soviet 
Bloc country] is so revolutionary that it is impossible to say where it will lead.”
196
 
In Brzezinski’s case, he was certainly not dependent on intelligence analysts or the New 
York Times for that matter to elaborate about what changes might occur in Poland due to the 
Gdansk Agreement. Already thinking that the developments would stir anxieties in Moscow, 
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Brzezinski called for an intricate and extremely thorough review, which included “detailed 
calculations of the specific steps that would be involved in preparations for such measures and 
the detection and assessment of actions revealing Soviet preparations to carry them out.” To be 
sufficient, this special analysis that Brzezinski demanded from the intelligence community would 
need to contain “specific extra dimensions.”
197
 
In the same timeframe of the Gdansk Agreement, the AFL-CIO had reached the 
conclusion that it should extend financial aid to the “fledgling” trade union movement in 
Poland.
198
 Brzezinski backed the idea, but Carter, once again displaying his propensity for 
cautious behavior, authorized Secretary of State Muskie to warn AFL-CIO President Lane 
Kirkland that his organization’s actions could be construed as “provocative” by the Soviets.
199
 
Also to Brzezinski’s extreme displeasure, Carter allowed Muskie to convey to Soviet 
Ambassador Dobrynin that Washington had “nothing to do with” the AFL-CIO initiative. The 
only manner in which Brzezinski succeeded regarding these matters was when he convinced 
Muskie to at least consult with Dobrynin in the presence of the Polish ambassador to give the 
appearance that the U.S. did not accept that Poland was a “vassal of the Soviet Union.”
200
 
In an expected move, the Polish government announced on September 5 that Stanislaw 
Kania had replaced Gierek as first secretary of the communist party. The Polish Parliament also 
voted to institute Josef Pinkowski as prime minister.
201
 Approximately ten days later, U.S. 
intelligence detected unusual Soviet activity in the western portion of the USSR, but these 
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reports concluded that there was no substantial evidence that a mobilization was taking place.
202
 
However, on September 19 Turner sent Brzezinski and others an assessment stating that “Soviet 
military activity detected in the last few days leads me to believe that the Soviet leadership is 
preparing to intervene militarily in Poland if the Polish situation is not brought under control in a 
manner satisfactory to Moscow.” Turner concluded his analysis by saying that Moscow would 
probably extend Kania more time to exert control, but if “current trends continue unabated 
against the Polish Party’s control over the nation or Poland’s role in the Warsaw Pact is called 
into question, the Soviets will threaten or employ military force.”
203
 
Just four days after Turner’s dark assessment, Brzezinski chaired an SCC meeting where 
Turner, Brown, Christopher, and acting JCS Chairman General Lew Allen were in attendance. 
The DCI told the participants that the situation was increasingly volatile and that the Soviets 
were in the process of taking preparatory military measures much like they had done in 
Czechoslovakia twelve years earlier. He also expressed that the Polish Communist Party was in 
chaos, and other Eastern European countries such as Romania, East Germany, and 
Czechoslovakia had growing concerns regarding the possible spillover effect from Poland, as 
their individual economic forecasts were commensurately gloomy. Turner concluded his input by 
saying that the stature of the Polish Church had risen significantly, and Moscow interpreted the 
working class’s strategic organizational skills as something which could threaten the overall 
fabric of the Warsaw Pact.
204
 Brzezinski added that the best option available to deter a Soviet 
invasion was a Polish resistance, coupled with a vigorous Western reaction.
205
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 It is without question that Moscow had already gauged that Brzezinski—possibly 
because of his Polish background—would factor significantly into the Western response. On the 
same day of the aforementioned SCC meeting, September 23, Pravda personally accused him 
and other “anti-socialist” elements in Poland of being the main culprits behind psychological 
warfare operations via Radio Free Europe and Voice of America.
206
 
Although the founding of Solidarity had been a momentous occasion in Poland, the 
breadth, depth, and organizational capabilities of the resistance movement were not fully known 
until a one-hour “warning strike” occurred during the first week of October. Its leadership by this 
point was able to effectively organize a simultaneous strike throughout the entire country from a 
single “national command center” where workers forcefully voiced their disdain for the 
government’s delay tactics regarding the implementation of the Gdansk Agreement. Intelligence 




In an obvious reference to the devolving nature of the situation with Solidarity, East 
German leader Erich Honecker stated in mid-October that “Poland is and will remain a socialist 
country. It belongs inseparably to the world of socialism and no one can turn back the wheel of 
history. Together with our friends in the socialist camp, we will see to that.”
208
 From the start, 
Brzezinski had felt that a clear and common purpose among Western leaders was one of the most 
important objectives in preventing a Soviet intervention, but at least one component of this 
strategy suffered a major setback when West Germany announced that an invasion of Poland 
should not be linked with détente, and that their cooperation with Moscow in the political and 
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economic spheres would continue in Bonn even if such a possibility occurred. Brzezinski was 
“irritated” by this development, noting that this was “the best proof yet of the increasing 
‘Finlandization’ of the Germans.”
209
 
Possibly as a response to Pravda’s personal attack in late September and because 
Brzezinski thought it was mandatory for Carter to remain in office at this critical juncture, he 
visited Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin twice in the last two weeks of October.
210
 In the 
first meeting Brzezinski assured him that a second Carter Administration would have great 
interest in starting the “process of gradual normalization” by exploring the options for an 
accommodation on Afghanistan. Brzezinski stated that the president “would no longer link a 
Soviet withdrawal” to the SALT agreement, while also dropping his insistence that Moscow 
replace Karmal in Kabul. The Soviet ambassador was also assured that the U.S. administration 
was not going to sell any military equipment to the Chinese, and the possibility of a Sino-
American military alliance was “absolutely out of the question.”
211
 Dobrynin later offered his 
analysis of the gesture: “Brzezinski did not draw a direct comparison between Reagan and 
Carter, but his statements strongly implied that, if reelected, Carter would still be able to put 
Soviet-American relations on the right track even though the process was unlikely to be easy. His 
message was clear: Moscow should not do anything to diminish Carter’s chances in the election 
race and might even help a bit.”
212
 
In a second meeting, just four days prior to Election Day, Brzezinski appeared to venture 
into an odd philosophical monologue about the historical animosity between Poland and the 
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Soviet Union, once referring to himself as a “former Pole.” He told Dobrynin: “Of course I am a 
long way from liking everything about the Soviet Union and its policy. But I am not all that anti-
Soviet as Moscow believes I am.”
213
 
Brzezinski’s actions with Dobrynin run somewhat parallel to his reasoning during the 
implementation of sanctions after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In both cases, he believed 
that the Russians would only act in a rational manner if they felt there was something worthwhile 
to lose. In essence, if Moscow felt that the Carter Administration was going to relax its future 
posture regarding Afghanistan and refrain from selling arms to the Chinese, then the Soviets 
might find those two incentives enticing enough to halt an invasion of Poland.             
Around the first of November, U.S. intelligence assets learned that Kania and Pinkowski 
had taken an “emergency trip” to the Soviet Union, a visit that CIA concluded had been 
“hurriedly arranged” by Moscow to exert pressure on the Polish leadership in order to bring the 
“erosion of the party” to a halt and to warn them of an impending intervention if they could not 
do so. CIA had also reported to the administration that Soviet force readiness had improved in 
the western USSR. Similar operations had occurred in the Baltic republics and Belorussia, but 
analysts surmised that these activities were still “well short” of the requirements for an overt 
invasion.
214
 Nevertheless, by any estimation the dynamics of the crisis were moving toward 
some type of a collision course. As in Afghanistan, Brzezinski at this stage was not basing his 
assessment on the question of whether or not force would be used; he was trying to ascertain if 
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that use of force would materialize in the form of a unilateral Soviet intervention, a unilateral 
crackdown by the Polish government, or a combination of both.
215
 
On November 4 voters in the U.S. handed down a convincing verdict on the 
Administration’s job performance, as former California governor Ronald Reagan won a landslide 
victory over Carter, a leader whose “promise to inaugurate a new age of American greatness had 
disintegrated . . . into the spectacle of a great nation in confused and global retreat.”
216
 During 
the campaign Reagan had attacked Carter’s naiveté and timidity in a relentless fashion. The 
challenger at one point in the Republican primaries even claimed to hear in Carter’s words “the 
sorry tapping of Neville Chamberlain’s umbrella on the cobblestones of Munich.”
217
 In truth, 
these attacks leveled against the administration were by no means a reflection of the hard-line 
stance that Brzezinski had advocated vis-à-vis Moscow from the very beginning, and the 
decisive actions he would take during the final months of the crisis in Poland help to prove that 
his hard-line advice to the president was not always limited to diplomatic rhetoric.  
Just after Kania and Pinkowski returned from their trip to Moscow, the Soviet 
ambassador in Warsaw made an attempt to sway a very important Polish Supreme Court ruling 
regarding Solidarity. Union leaders had already stood firm in their quest to have a statute 
“expressing adherence to the Communist Party” removed, but they were now also demanding 
that “Rural Solidarity” be allowed to register as an additional independent union. Indeed, the 
workers threatened a massive, nationwide strike to commence on November 12 if these demands 
were not met. Before the Court’s ruling, Warsaw and Moscow made an announcement that joint 
military exercises had recently been held inside Poland’s borders, an obvious stab at scaring the 
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union leadership and, presumably, to influence the Court’s decision. This strategy ultimately 
failed, and the Court ruled in favor of Solidarity, prompting the Kremlin’s “propaganda” chief to 
deliver a diatribe on Moscow television accusing Western groups of funneling millions of dollars 
into Poland to aid the opposition.
218
 
The Court’s favorable ruling, antithetically, did not bring about a pause in Solidarity’s 
confrontational position toward the regime. Almost immediately following the decision, 
disruptions in Gdansk, Lublin, and Lodz indicated that workers in a variety of professions were 
not willing to settle for incremental change by the government. However, the event that threw 
the already precarious situation into overdrive emerged when the Polish police raided 
Solidarity’s Warsaw office on November 20 and subsequently arrested Jan Narozniak and Piotr 
Sapielo. This event, later known as the “Narozniak affair,” was directly responsible for strikes 
and strike warnings which both coincided with a railway demonstration already underway. The 
railway strike, in particular, produced added anxiety for Moscow, compelling the Soviet public 
information agency (TASS) to characterize it as “a problem for Poland’s national security.”  
 In the days ahead the Warsaw faction of the MKZ (Interfactory Founding Commission) 
issued an updated list of worker demands to the regime. Among these were the release of jailed 
Solidarity activists, an investigation of police power, and imposition of limits on the budget of 
the prosecutor’s office. The KKP (Solidarity’s National Coordinating Commission) backed these 
additional demands, but the government was well aware that these actions were a threat to the 
general security apparatus and, if agreed to, would certainly diminish the regime’s ability to 
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survive politically. In fact, U.S. intelligence called these events “the gravest challenge to [the 
Polish regime’s] authority since the strikes on the Baltic coast ended in August.”
219
 
 Sensing that things were coming to a head, Brzezinski sent Muskie and Brown a 
memo—specifically designed to be leaked to the press—which stated that a “Soviet intervention 
would produce a rupture in the political détente in Europe, disrupt East-West economic 
cooperation, generate increased NATO budgets, produce severe strains between Western 




In the weeks ahead Brzezinski was motivated to deter Soviet force like at no other time in 
his entire tenure as national security adviser. To be sure, during the Polish strikes in late 
November he had given Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman designate Charles Percy 
(R-IL) a personal letter with instructions that it be handed to Foreign Minister Gromyko while 
the senator was in Moscow. In the text, Brzezinski stated firmly that, “The use of troops in 
Poland would change the face of the globe. . .”
221
 
 On December 1 the latest intelligence picture from CIA showed “an unusually high level 
of Warsaw Pact military activity” both within Poland and around its borders. This activity was 
comprised of units from Poland itself, the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, 
and, according to estimates, the nature of these maneuvers was “unprecedented for this time of 
year.”
222
 In addition to Brzezinski’s aforementioned access to Kuklinski’s raw intelligence 
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reports, he also kept a watchful eye on the detailed satellite images coming in from Poland,
223
 but 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact troop movements on this particular day were somewhat obscured due to 
inclement weather in Europe.
224
 Nevertheless, Brzezinski gathered that the situation was 
untenable for Moscow. During the president’s morning brief, Brzezinski told Carter that they 
needed to ask themselves if their warnings to Moscow had been sufficiently clear.
225
 Carter took 
his cue and relayed to Thatcher, Schmidt, and Giscard that the situation had “entered it most 
critical stage” and “preparations by the Soviets for a possible intervention have progressed 
further than at any previous time.” The corresponding embassies of Great Britain, West 
Germany, and France were also given the latest intelligence and urged to convey their views in a 
public or private manner regarding the consequences of a direct intervention.
226
 
The next day something quite strange occurred. While Brzezinski was pressing Carter to 
issue a joint statement with president-elect Reagan to express their collective concerns, the 
Washington Post was simultaneously reporting sensitive intelligence information on its front 
page about Soviet troop posturing. In a memo to the president , Brzezinski had admitted that the 
NSC was not in full agreement that a joint statement should be issued, but he advised Carter to 
do so anyway in order to establish a clear “historical record.”
227
 It is certainly possible that 
Brzezinski intentionally leaked the intelligence information regarding Soviet troops to the Post 
as he had done with the memo to Muskie and Brown, thus making it more probable that Carter 
would side with him on the issue and to exert more pressure on the president-elect. The Post 
attributed the information to “unnamed senior U.S. officials,”  and Brzezinski was well aware that 
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the transitional period between U.S. administrations could have been viewed by Moscow as a 
time of paralysis in Washington. 
 To be sure, late that afternoon White House Press Secretary Jody Powell warned 
Moscow that it would be a “serious mistake for any government, for any nation, under any 
circumstance to assume that in a period of transition between one administration and the next . . .  
that the American Government lacks either the will or the ability to respond appropriately.” 
However, this was not the joint statement that Brzezinski initially pushed.
228
 The debate 
continued. 
The White House received information on December 3 indicating that Soviet troops in 
East Germany would be ready to move in two to five days. This time, however, Hungarian forces 
were mentioned as a likely addition to the others on alert.
229
 That afternoon Brzezinski, Turner, 
Brown, and Muskie met to discuss contingency planning for a Soviet intervention and also to 
deliberate the pros and cons of issuing a public statement from the White House. As noted, it was 
clear that Brzezinski was in favor of such a move, yet some of the individuals present had their 
reservations. To sway the participants during the meeting, Brzezinski asked, “Wouldn’t it be odd 
if Governor Reagan and [his adviser] Richard Allen appeared to make the stronger statements?” 
He continued, “One has to think about history. We will have to ask ourselves whether we had 
done all we could do to prevent an invasion.”
230
 Similar to Carter’s briefing two days earlier, it 
appears that Brzezinski was attempting to manipulate his colleagues by framing the debate in 
historical terms. In one of those “how will the history books view you?” moments, he couched 
their available options in a futuristic setting which probably had the effect of mitigating some of 
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their concerns for the present. In any event, Brzezinski prevailed and Carter issued a public 
statement (without president-elect Reagan),
231
 but one which was considerably weak when 
compared with his bluster after the invasion of Afghanistan. 
Consistent with the dire tone of American intelligence reports, the Polish government 
issued its strongest statement to date on the same afternoon that Carter had released the 
administration’s first public warning to the Soviets. Warsaw sternly berated those Poles “who do 
not hide their counterrevolutionary plans” and threatened in unequivocal terms to extinguish 
Solidarity’s plans for “anarchy and chaos.” In addition, the media in Poland reported that the 
Military Council of the Ministry of National Defense had convened and expressed “profound 
concern” regarding the situation, noting that Solidarity was now being viewed as a “serious 
threat” to the existing national order.
232
 Surprisingly, as these bleak reports were coming into the 
White House, Brzezinski finally received some good news. The West German ambassador to the 
U.S., due to public opinion pressures in Europe, conveyed that Bonn had changed course and 
would now adopt economic sanctions against Moscow if an invasion of Poland occurred.
233
 
In a meeting on Saturday, December 6, DCI Turner confirmed that there was “additional 
evidence of increased Soviet preparedness for an invasion” and asserted that the USSR “will go 
[emphasis added] into Poland on Monday or Tuesday.” Using the invasion of Afghanistan and 
the administration’s failure to adequately warn U.S. allies on the matter, Brzezinski fought to 
publicize the current intelligence assessments. He also suggested that the administration call for a 
United Nations Security Council meeting, thereby alerting Solidarity of the imminent danger that 
appeared to be just days away. After a lengthy discussion, Brown and Christopher decided 
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against these recommendations, as they were “still hesitant about the accuracy of the CIA 
analysis.” Brzezinski implored that the U.S. had a moral obligation to forewarn the Polish people 
if it was “fairly certain” that an invasion was going to take place, but he could not persuade the 
others to change their minds. Not finished, Brzezinski then called the president at Camp David 




If it is not abundantly clear that Brzezinski to this point had done everything within his 
power to protect Poland from a Soviet invasion, his actions on December 7 would end all doubts. 
The participants for the NSC gathering were President Carter, Secretary of State Muskie, Deputy 
Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Brown, DCI Turner, and, of course, 
Brzezinski. Roughly a half hour into the proceedings, Turner walked out to take a phone call and 
returned shortly with information that plans for a Soviet intervention had been completed two 
days earlier. He said a “joint decision” had been reached in which Soviet, East German, and 
Czechoslovak troops would enter Poland simultaneously later that same evening or the next 
morning. Due to this development, those who had advised against publicizing the intelligence 
information apparently reassessed their positions and a consensus was reached to consult 
Congressional leaders, issue a public statement on Soviet preparations, inform allied leaders, and 
alert the UN Secretary General of recent developments.
235
 But after this meeting adjourned, it 
appears that Brzezinski called yet another meeting in which he advocated that the U.S. warn the 
Soviets of an American blockade of Cuba if Moscow used its troops to enter Poland.
236
 It is not 
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known what the collective reaction was to Brzezinski’s suggestion, but, without a doubt, it could 
have possibly precipitated a dangerous escalation between the two superpowers.  
As opposed to the situation just before the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Brzezinski had 
many private connections in Poland and used them skillfully. He warned various Solidarity 
leaders through arranged telephone conversations that they should take precautionary measures 
to prevent themselves from being detained by the Polish Security Forces during early morning 
raids.
237
 Brzezinski also briefed John Paul II by telephone on the latest intelligence information 
and asked him to urge various Western European governments to threaten Moscow with 




On December 8 Brzezinski “ordered” Voice of America and Radio Free Europe to 
broadcast Carter’s White House statement on Soviet preparations for the invasion of Poland.
239
 
Later that same evening he summed up his strategy to date in a diary entry:  
I see four objectives to what we are doing: One is to deprive the Soviets of 
surprise. This we have already done. Two, perhaps to encourage the Poles to resist 
if they are not taken by surprise, for this might somewhat deter the Soviets. The 
publicity is already doing that. Thirdly and paradoxically, to calm the situation in 
Poland by making the Poles more aware that the Soviets may in fact enter. The 
Poles have till now discounted this possibility and this may have emboldened 
them excessively. Here in effect we have a common interest with the Soviets, for 
they too may prefer to intimidate the Poles to a degree. And fourth, to deter the 
Soviets from coming in by intensifying international pressure and condemnation 
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As Brzezinski was contemplating his strategic designs, four Czech divisions had been 
deployed, communication efforts among the Warsaw Pact countries intensified, and numerous 
Soviet officers had occupied the Polish Defense Ministry to coordinate a possible invasion and to 
hinder any Polish resistance. Although somewhat satisfied at this stage that Carter had avoided 
the mistakes of the Johnson Administration before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Brzezinski, 
presumably to keep the president focused, gave him “two editorials from the Wall Street Journal 
of 1968, one from July arguing that the U.S. should be speaking up, and one in September after 
the August invasion criticizing the U.S. for having been silent.”
241
  
 Over the next few days, U.S. intelligence sources indicated that twenty-seven Soviet 
Army divisions were available for combat and surrounding Poland on every front. Yet Moscow 
still had not given the command to enter , belying what DCI Turner had earlier suggested. 
Nevertheless, Brzezinski remained adamant to deter an intervention. Thinking of every 
conceivable angle and strategy possible, he phoned AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland once 
more on December 12 and urged the consideration of a “collective international transport 
worker’s reaction which could paralyze any movement of Soviet ships or airplanes,” having the 
effect of “embargoing any movement of goods to the Soviet Union.” Brzezinski stated clearly to 
Kirkland as the call ended that he wanted this action taken “before the Soviets intervene.”
242
 
Later, Brzezinski wrote a memo to Brown at the Defense Department—again designed to be 
leaked to the press—titled “Weapons for China” asking for an assessment of the various 
weapons which could be transferred to Beijing.
243
 But he was not finished. On the same day he 
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leaked information to the Wall Street Journal which outlined the possibility of additional U.S. 
economic sanctions against the Soviets if they made a decision to enter Poland.
244
 
Perhaps as a result of Brzezinski’s requests coupled with the dire nature of these 
developments, the Pontiff sent an “unprecedented” letter to Brezhnev: 
I address myself to the preoccupation of Europe and the whole world as regards 
the tension created by the internal events taking place in Poland during these last 
months. Poland is one of the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act. This nation 
was, in September 1939, the victim of an aggression which was at the root of the 
terrible period of occupation, which lasted until 1945. . .Having in mind, then, the 
various serious motivations of the preoccupation created by the tension over the 
actual situation in Poland, I ask you to do everything you can in order that all that 
constitutes the causes of this preoccupation, according to widespread opinion, be 
removed. . . . The events that have taken place in Poland these last months have 
been caused by the ineluctable necessity of the economic reconstruction of the 
country, which requires, at the same time, a moral reconstruction based on the 
conscious engagement based, in solidarity, of all the forces of the entire society. I 
am confident that you will do everything you can in order to dispel the actual 
tension, in order that political public opinion may be reassured about such a 




The letter was penned using full diplomatic courtesies, yet its meaning was crystal clear. 
Solidarity was an internal issue—not one for Brezhnev and the Politburo to decide.
246
   
 Soon after Brzezinski took these actions, intelligence sources reported that the threat of 
an overt Soviet invasion of Poland was diminishing. Some of the divisions that had been 
deployed on high alert in November were returning to their garrisons as a result of Moscow’s 
decision to give the Poles more time to handle their own internal affairs. During this time NATO 
had also issued a communiqué to the Soviets stating that the infringement on the “basic rights of 
any state to territorial integrity and independence” would destroy détente and p lace NATO allies 
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in a position “to react in a manner which the gravity of this development would require.”
247
 
Thus, it appears at first glance that the cumulative effect of a strong response by the Western 
allies and a multitude of personal efforts on Brzezinski’s behalf had convinced Moscow that the 
possible gains of invading Poland were far outweighed by the consequences of such an action; 
however, this reasoning is only true, in part. 
 In 1993 previously secret East German Communist Party documents were released to the 
public, which shared additional reasons with regard to why the Soviets did not invade Poland in 
late 1980. These documents illustrate that Erich Honecker pressed Brezhnev to quell the 
“counterrevolutionary forces,” or the consequences of not doing so would mean “the death of 
socialist Poland.” But although Brezhnev believed that Solidarity was a major threat to the 
communist system as a whole and that a military intervention would bring forth drastic measures 
by the West, much of his hesitation was due to Afghanistan. Professor Manfred Wilke, the head 
of the research group at the Free University of Berlin which released the documents, said, “The 
reasons had to do with the Soviet Union’s international position. I think the fact that the 
Afghanistan war had been launched a year earlier . . . plus the decisiveness of the United States 
were the key reasons why this step was not taken.”
248
 In addition, Georgi Arbatov, a close 
adviser to Brezhnev, later gave his opinion regarding the connection between the two crises: 
“Our very poor military performance saved Poland. If we’d been able to achieve our goals in 
Afghanistan reasonably quickly, I have no doubt we would have invaded Poland, too.”
249
   
 The 1993 East German documents and Arbatov’s statements are helpful in ascertaining 
the true reasons why Moscow hesitated to intervene, but for the purposes of this study it is 
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mandatory to know what the president and Brzezinski were thinking at that time. In Carter’s 
memoirs, published in 1982, he states the following: “I was convinced that the Soviets would 
already have moved into Poland if they had not been bogged down in Afghanistan and 
condemned by most nations of the world for it.”
250
 In addition, when asked if Afghanistan 
figured prominently into the Soviet calculus vis-à-vis Poland in late 1980, Brzezinski responded 
with obvious self-satisfaction: 
Oh, absolutely, absolutely. That certainly was a complication that they had to very 
much take into account. And beyond that they also had to take into account that 
the Poles would probably resist. And they had in the White House a president 
who made the gutsy decision in Afghanistan and a national security adviser who 





Aside from the political, economic, and diplomatic components of Moscow’s hesitation, 
military complications existed as well. By the end of 1980, the number of Soviet troops in 
Afghanistan had risen to eighty-five thousand. Moreover, the Kremlin had stationed another 
thirty-thousand just across the Afghani border in the USSR.
252
 For these reasons, the thought of 
another massive military commitment was difficult for Brezhnev to contemplate, which, in the 
end, forced him to “place all hopes on an internal Polish solution.”
253
  
 Strategically, Brzezinski was correct in his early analysis that the Soviet Union would be 
less likely to enter Poland if the Kremlin was bogged down in Afghanistan. His academic 
background and immense knowledge of history undoubtedly played a role in this assessment, as 
Afghanistan was widely known as a country which has strenuously resisted the efforts of foreign 
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 In fact, Brzezinski himself has said as much: “The Afghans just so happen to have a 
curious complex: They don’t like foreigners with guns in their country.”
255
 
  It is highly unlikely that any other national security adviser to the president—or any 
other individual who ever served in a U.S. administration, for that matter—has personally ever 
attempted to do as much to shape the outcome of a single international crisis than Brzezinski did 
during the final months of 1980. Indeed, his personal attention to this situation far exceeded 
those actionable recommendations that he offered to Carter with regard to Afghanistan. In this 
light, one might wonder if Brzezinski would have approached a similar situation in a country 
other than Poland with as much zeal and enthusiasm. In this author’s opinion, the answer is an 
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 A whole host of individuals have used the Brzezinski interview with Le Nouvel 
Observateur to concoct a mind-bending number of conspiracy theories which adamantly—and 
wrongly—accuse the Carter Administration of luring the Soviets into Afghanistan. The 
confusion becomes even greater due to the fact that these conspiracy theorists have been quite 
proficient at blurring the context of Slocombe’s original question regarding the “value” of 
“sucking the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire.”  
In reality, Walt Slocombe’s question on March 30, 1979 was semantically composed in a 
future context that an invasion of Afghanistan was imminent. One must remember that the 
administration had already received intelligence reports earlier that month that the Afghan 
insurgents had “achieved surprising successes,”
256
 prompting CIA to conclude that the “Soviets 
may well be prepared to intervene.”
257
 In essence, he asked the question with hopes that others 
would also give their thoughts on the value of keeping the Soviets there once Moscow staged a 
formal invasion. This is precisely the reason why Robert Gates could not recall anyone in the 
administration ever “attempting to induce them to invade,” although he is responsible for 
bringing Slocombe’s question into the public discussion.
258
  When Gates was later asked if he 
had any idea that disclosing this information in From the Shadows would create doubts as to the 
administration’s true objectives, he responded: “No, because there was no basis in fact for an 
allegation the administration tried to draw the Soviets into Afghanistan militarily.”
259
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Regarding the French reporter’s question concerning the administration’s desire to 
“provoke” a Soviet intervention, Brzezinski responded: “It wasn’t quite like that. We didn’t push 
the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.”
260
 This is 
truth. It has been shown that Brzezinski and others were well aware that the aid to the 
Mujahideen could have unintended consequences, but what were their strategic choices at the 
time? Not many. In mid-1979 Brzezinski believed that the Soviet Union was going to invade 
Afghanistan—regardless. And he was not prepared to stand idle while Moscow continued its 
pushing and probing around the globe. Many strategic choices in the international arena have 
their drawbacks; however this does not mean that American foreign policy leaders should not 
make any decisions for fear of the unintended consequences. The aforementioned observation by 
Brzezinski reflects the fact that the administration was concerned that the aid could produce what 
is called “blowback.” But the thought of doing absolutely nothing at the time was not an option.   
When Brzezinski stated in 1998 that the “secret operation was an excellent idea,” he 
immediately followed it with a very important qualifying admission: “The day that the Soviets 
officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, essentially: ‘We now have the 
opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.’” In all actuality, a “secret operation” did 
exist to draw the Soviets into an “Afghan trap”—only if the Kremlin staged a formal invasion. 
But another important point also surfaced during the course of this project. When others have 
referred to the covert aid package to the Mujahideen as a “secret operation,” the meaning is 
somewhat misleading. To the masses it was a classified matter for a long period of time, but t o 
those on the ground in Pakistan and Afghanistan the aid was common knowledge—certainly the 
Soviets were well aware of its existence. Les Gelb recalled: “I thought everybody knew about the 
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covert aid, quite frankly. It was done even at that early stage [1979] fairly non-covertly. The 




As it has been shown, the initial aid package to the Mujahideen was a very minimal 
$500,000 of non-lethal equipment. It is possible that one would be hard-pressed to entice a 
couple of slightly above-average professional boxers to fight one another for $500,000.
262
 To be 
sure, Sir Lawrence Freedman summed it up best in A Choice of Enemies: “In 1979, the United 
States was at most a bit player in a local drama with its script written elsewhere.”
263
 The covert 
aid package on July 3, 1979, at least in Brzezinski’s mind, was an important first step to help 
strengthen the Mujahideen against the Soviet puppet government in Afghanistan and to provide 
other countries—particularly Poland—with future protection in the event that the Soviets 
continued their aggressive behavior around the globe. That is it.  
In addition to all the confusion with context and semantics, it must be remembered that 
Le Nouvel Observateur is a French magazine. Brzezinski’s 1998 interview was originally 
published in French and later translated into English. Again, he has contested the following 
statement: “And that very day [July 3, 1979], I wrote a note to the president in which I explained 
to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention [in 
Afghanistan].”
264
 Brzezinski explained the situation as such: “As far as the French interview is 
concerned, it was not an interview but excerpts from an interview that was originally supposed to 
be published in full but which they never checked with me for approval in the form that it did 
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 From this, is it not possible that the language barrier, coupled with the translation 
process, could have both played a prominent role in the mix-up?  
In reality, if the French reporter did not commit a journalistic error or plan a media 
ambush, most likely Brzezinski was practicing some type of audience-based ambiguity. Here, he 
could have made the decision to tell this one reporter that the administration set an “Afghan trap” 
for the Kremlin, with hopes that the story would serve to bolster his own role in the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The theory in this case, though, would have one believe that Brzezinski 
intentionally clouded the historical truth—for one interview—to reap the rewards, yet planned to 
later deny the whole story to insulate his reputation from the dark aspects associated with the 
millions of casualties that were incurred by the Afghani people. To be sure, this is highly 
unlikely.   
With that said, another highly unlikely scenario exists which would negate the entire 
argument that Brzezinski did not mentally plan to lure the Soviets into an “Afghan trap.” Its 
validity rests upon the notion that he was so certain that Carter would not stand firm with the 
Soviets throughout 1979 that essentially every memo written to the president was diabolically 
composed in an effort to cultivate the landscape for future funding to the Mujahideen and to 
exonerate him later in the court of history. Brzezinski would have orchestrated a scenario such as 
this to ensure that Carter was primed to take a bold stand once the plan to draw the Soviets into 
Afghanistan was complete and to give himself a historical alibi if Moscow happened to succeed 
militarily.  
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For this scenario to even enter into the realm of plausibility, it would mean that the 
Brzezinski memos to Carter, specifically those stating that a victory for Moscow would most 
likely “promote a separate Baluchistan” and give the Soviets “access to the Indian Ocean while 
dismembering Pakistan and Iran,”
266
 were designed to alarm the president while the strategic 
assessment itself was pure fabrication. Again, this scenario is extremely unlikely. The Brzezinski 
memos to the president were almost certainly written in good faith and prove that Brzezinski did 
not want the Soviets to invade Afghanistan, although he was fairly certain that Moscow had 
made the decision to do so anyway.  
 In Brzezinski’s March 2, 1979 memo to Carter, he stated the following: “It is a fact that 
both abroad and increasingly at home the United States is seen as indecisive, vacillating, and 
pursuing a policy of acquiescence. We are perceived as neither responding effectively to Soviet 
assertiveness and as unable to generate a broad strategy that is relevant to the times.”
267
 This 
memo—written four months before the covert aid finding was signed—specifically argued for 
Carter to come forth with a strong public response. From this evidence, who could possibly 
claim that Brzezinski had hoped to secretly lure the Soviets into an invasion of Afghanistan?  
Unless Brzezinski wrote the March 2 memo attempting to fool Carter with some strange type of 
mental jiu-jitsu, it is almost certain that he had every intention of preventing the Soviets from 
doing so. When Walt Slocombe was asked very directly if there was even a possibility that 
Brzezinski alone could have wanted the Soviets to invade Afghanistan, he replied: “I think it 
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Brzezinski’s own personal notation in his diary also holds considerable weight to counter 
those claims that he viewed the invasion as a “dream come true.” He wrote: 
Had we been tougher sooner, had we drawn the line more clearly, had we engaged 
in the kind of consultations that I had so many times advocated, maybe the 
Soviets would not have engaged in this act of miscalculation. As it is, American-
Soviet relations will have been set back for a long time to come. What was done 
[referring to the Carter Doctrine] had to be done, but it would have been better if 





 Again, these words were written in 1982—a full sixteen years before the interview with Le 
Nouvel Observateur.  
Dennis Ross, a former administration official and Middle East negotiator for several U.S. 
presidents, appeared quite sure of Brzezinski’s intentions during 1979: “The invasion wasn’t 
seen as an advantage from the Carter’s Administration’s standpoint. What Brzezinski was saying 
is once they’re in there then there was a reason to make them pay, but it certainly wasn’t 
something that was desired.”
270
 
Regarding Poland’s connection with Afghanistan, however, if one revisits the 
uncontested comments that Brzezinski provided to Le Nouvel Observateur in 1998, it is not 
difficult to surmise that there was clearly an unintended yet inferred distinction between the 
importance of Afghani lives lost during the Soviet occupation and his strategic ambitions to free 
his homeland from the chains of communism. To recount, when asked if he regretted having 
“supported Islamic fundamentalism,” Brzezinski rhetorically replied, “What is more important in 
world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some agitated Muslims or the 
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liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?” Again, to this day he has never 
retracted this part of the interview, and this technical distinction is very important when 
juxtaposed with other statements he has made over the years.  
In 1981 Brzezinski was asked whether it might have been to the “advantage of free men 
and women everywhere if the Polish crisis were allowed to blow up in the face of the Soviet 
Union, putting great strain on the cohesion of whole ghastly tyranny?” He responded: “Well, 
what if we did as you suggest—what if our unhelpful attitude vis-à-vis the Polish crisis led to 
Soviet intervention, military occupation, massive bloodshed and, concomitantly with these, the 
intensification of police suppression in the Soviet Union? . . I am doubtful whether such an 
upheaval would lead to the disintegration of the Soviet system, but it would certainly lead to 
chaos and a world crisis of the first magnitude. Only the poor and the weak can afford to have 
wars and war-like crises in our day.”
271
 Thus, it can be deduced from these two examples that 
Brzezinski believed that “some agitated Muslims” in Afghanistan—in essence, bloodshed in 
Afghanistan—was far preferable to bloodshed in Poland. To be clear, this line of reasoning is not 
intended to render a moral judgment of Brzezinski the man, but to reinforce that his mindset 
during the period from 1979-1980 was geared to protect Poland—regardless of the human cost to 
others in the process. 
Even after the Carter Administration had left office, Brzezinski continued his efforts to 
ensure that his homeland was not forgotten by the incoming Republican administration. Learning 
on one occasion that Reagan CIA head William Casey had cut the funding for a “very 
worthwhile project” concerning Poland, Brzezinski complained and requested that the $18,000 
for the program be reallocated. Shortly thereafter, a man appeared at his office and handed him a 
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briefcase containing the full amount. Brzezinski then “passed it on to a visiting Pole associated 
with the project who was headed back to Europe.”
272
 
In all likelihood, it is extremely difficult for most to understand Brzezinski’s relentless 
devotion to Poland. A vast majority of individuals are born in one nat ion and usually remain 
within its boundaries for their entire life. Nevertheless, if anything can effectively drive home the 
point that one of Brzezinski’s primary focuses for keeping the Soviets in Afghanistan was to 
protect his homeland, the following anecdote does just that: 
In the summer of 1953, a twenty-five-year-old Zbigniew Brzezinski dropped by 
Radio Free Europe headquarters in Munich. It was there that he first met Jan 
Nowak-Jezioranski, the head of the Polish desk for RFE. Nowak-Jezioranski was 
astonished by Brzezinski’s encyclopedic knowledge of the Polish wartime 
underground and his dedication to the radio services. He was stunned. “For God’s 
sake, you are so very young!” Nowak-Jezioranski told the Harvard student. “How 
can you explain your dedication to this instrument?!” Nowak-Jezioranski later 
found his answer. “His father [Tadeusz Brzezinski] later told me that since he was 





 The preceding story, combined with other information regarding Brzezinski’s connection 
to his homeland that was presented in this thesis, leads to the conclusion that the welfare of 
Poland would have been a foremost concern for him amidst the global volatility in 1979. If one 
closely assesses Brzezinski’s available options to stave off a Soviet invasion of Poland—which 
easily could have occurred, and almost did—it is not a stretch to contend that Afghanistan would 
have been front and center in his strategic calculations. “It’s highly plausible that Brzezinski 
would have been thinking along those lines,” said Dennis Ross. “If you’re bleeding them, then it 
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  Although Brzezinski has admitted that his ultimate strategy vis-à-vis the Soviets in 
Afghanistan was to protect Poland, he remains reluctant to provide additional information which 
opens the door for future research in this area. In all probability, however , the truth of the matter 
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Appendix: Brzezinski Email Linking Afghanistan and Poland 
 
 
J.B. White <jbwhitejr@gmail.com> 
 
Afghanistan and Poland Thesis 
2 messages 
 
J.B. White <jbwhitejr@gmail.com> Wed, Nov 9, 2011 at 2:57 AM 
Bcc: zbrzezinski@csis.org,  
Dr. Brzezinski, 
 
First, I hope you are well. 
 
I recently interviewed you for my thesis at LSU, and here is the thrust of what I will be arguing: 
 
You did not willfully attempt to "suck the Soviets into a Vietnamese quagmire" in Afghanistan. The 
covert aid approved on July 3, 1979 was minimal. However, you did think that the Soviets were going 
in anyway (perhaps due to Czech in 1968, Angola, and Ethiopia etc) so you and others hoped that 
they would get stuck for a variety of reasons. Among the many reasons for you was that the situation 
in Poland was heating up around the same time (see Kuklinski) and if the Soviets were paying a price 
in Afghanistan, then they would think twice before striking at another victim--particularly Poland.  
 
Again, thanks for the interview, sir. It is my hope that you will comment on my assessment either via 









Zbigniew Brzezinski <ZBrzezinski@csis.org> Wed, Nov 9, 2011 at 11:00 AM 
To: "J.B. White" <jbwhitejr@gmail.com> 
Dear J.B.: 
  










 J.B. White was born in McComb, Mississippi, and graduated from the University of 
Mississippi in December 1999. He is both a former U.S. Marine and member of the Army 
National Guard, serving in Iraq from early 2003-2004 with the 168
th
 Engineering Group. While 
deployed to the Middle East, White was the recipient of the Army Commendation Medal and the 
Combat Action Badge. After working in New York City for two years upon his return from Iraq, 
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